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ABSTRACT 
 
 
The American University in Cairo  
 
CREATED VULNERABILITIES: POLITICAL ECONOMY OF  
TOURISM DEVELOPMENT IN SHARM El SHEIKH 
 
 
Catherine Walsh 
 
 
Sharm El Sheikh represents the typical tourism enclave: removed from the local 
culture and environment, homogenous with other destinations in the global south, 
and designed to serve the vacationing needs of mass tourism. This form of 
tourism development is dated and set to fail, particularly when challenged with 
political instability and violence. Literature on mass tourism to the global south 
focuses on structural dependency of resorts, but often fail to complicate this 
relationship with internal political decision making. This qualitative case study 
examines the development of the resort to cater to the desires of the mass tourism 
model. The socio-economic dependency of the space on the state and global 
tourism dynamics, the exclusion of the local population, and the complicated 
security crisis in the peninsula are analyzed as they remain significant challenges 
to future recovery of this resort. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
 The downing of Russian Metrojet flight 9268 caused a fracture in the tourism 
sector of Egypt, unprecedented in recent history. The largest attack targeting tourists 
within the state, occurred on October 31, 2015, where shortly after the flight departed 
Sharm el Sheikh, an explosion brought down the aircraft killing 224 passengers and crew 
members.  This tragedy caused the immediate and long term halting of international 
flights into the resort resulting in industry losses for Egypt, totaling $5.5 billion dollars 
from 2015 – 2016. This represents the largest percentage of tourism lost due to political 
instability since 1990. While this dramatic loss in tourism can be explained through a 
cause and effect relationship of terrorism and tourism decline, there are additional factors 
related to the industry’s development, which has laid the foundation for potential long 
term crisis within the tourism industry. 
 The Mubarak regime viewed tourism as a method of resisting outside economic 
influence and maintaining regime stability. The regime utilized rapid developments of 
tourism spaces in the Sinai as a vehicle for generating revenues, representing a 
diversification of the tourism sector when violence threatened its stability. Diversification 
of tourism was a necessary step when the industry was destabilized by terrorist violence 
and the regime simultaneously faced economic structural changes which threatened its 
support throughout Egyptian society. On one hand, the active encouragement of tourism 
development, through legal changes and patrimonial based policies, allowed the regime 
to strengthen support among the economic elite of the state. This diversification into sun 
and sand tourism represented a resistance to looming neoliberal changes, whose swift 
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implementation had the potential to negatively affect the working class of the state. The 
development of the tourism space in the South Sinai was rapid and uncontrolled, relied 
on externally based and controlled demand, expanded beyond actual demand creating 
oversupply, and disenfranchised the existing local populations. The short-sighted nature 
of this development policy created several vulnerabilities within the economic and 
political spheres of the country: over-reliance on externally controlled demand, inability 
to remain competitive globally, creation of extreme internal competition, decline in 
image of the destination, and overuse of the space leading to ecological degradation. 
Development policies pursued by the Mubarak regime in the South Sinai have created a 
vulnerability to decline which has been exacerbated by political instability following the 
revolution and the terrorist attack of the Metrojet bombing of 2015.  
 Sharm el Sheikh, and the wider South Sinai, represent an entirely different tourist 
space from other historically tourist spaces in Egypt, such as Giza and Luxor.  This new 
tourism space in the South Sinai has provided large growth in the tourism sector over the 
past two decades through the targeting of a specific kind of tourist. The South Sinai 
tourist industry embodied 30% of the overall tourism within the country by 2014.1 Mass 
based sun/sand tourism is only beginning to return to the country, and has yet to fully 
return to the struggling economy of the South Sinai. The exclusive reliance on the 
consumption of these spaces by the mass beach tourist created conditions where the loss 
of these tourists could significantly impact the tourism sector of the state. While Egypt 
 
1 CAPMAS, Annual Tourism, 2003 – 2016;  Number of Tourists Arriving Annually, 2005 – 2016 
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sets it sights on building alternate beach based tourist spaces, the South Sinai and Sharm 
el Sheikh may never regain the levels of tourism once propping up these resort enclaves.  
 
1.1 Notes on Sharm El Sheikh: A Once Booming Ghost Town 
 
  Sharm El Sheikh, a resort city in the South Sinai, was rapidly developed 
following instability in the national tourism sector due to terrorism in the mid-1990s. By 
2003, the resort had 221 hotels and contained 88% of five star hotels in the South Sinai. 2 
This resort was highly important to the national tourism sector, as foreign tourism into 
the South Sinai rose from 1 million visitors in 2000 to 3.7 million tourists in 2010.3 In 
2010, the tourist arrivals into the South Sinai accounted for 25% of all tourist arrivals into 
Egypt and 2.8 million tourists into the South Sinai came from Europe.4 The national 
tourism sector has faced significant challenges due to political instability, however the 
South Sinai remained a strong contributor to the national sector. The South Sinai 
accounted for 2 million European tourists in 2014, 2.78 million tourists overall and 
represented 28% of the 9.87 million tourists arrivals into Egypt in 2014.5 The South 
Sinai, and the resort of Sharm el Sheikh, became an integral part of the national tourism 
sector over these two decades, however the largest terrorist attack against tourists 
effectively halted tourism into Sharm for almost 2 years.  
 
2 Sims, David and Miniawy. South Sinai Development Profile. South Sinai Governorate Environmental 
Action Plan. (Nov 2003).  2.1.4 
3 CAPMAS, Annual Tourism, 2003 – 2016; Hotel Activity and Touristic Villages, 2013 - 2015 
4 CAPMAS, Annual Tourism, 2003 – 2016; Nights by Nationality, 2006 - 2015 
5 CAPMAS, Annual Tourism, 2003 – 2016; Hotel Activity and Touristic Villages, 2013 – 2015; Nights by 
Nationality, 2006 - 2015 
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 The downing of Metrojet flight 9268 in Fall 2015 effectively created a ghost town 
out of the formerly booming tourist resort of Sharm el Sheikh. The crippling conditions 
within the area created a sense of despair for local businesses and informal workers. 
Closed shops and empty streets relay the lack of tourism within the resort. Like a 
sardonic joke, billboards plastered with the smiling face of al-Sisi are scattered 
throughout Sharm el Sheikh, hailing it as a ‘City of Peace’ in Arabic, Russian and 
English. This marketing campaign within the city is wholly detached from the depressing 
situation and illuminates the government’s inability to actively engage with the actuality 
of the problem. This lack of engagement on the part of the government is mirrored in the 
continually dashed hopes of the informal workers, who actively monitor news regarding 
resuming direct flights into the city. This distinct feeling of loss, observations of closed 
businesses and informal interviews with workers who have persevered through this 
devastation have implanted the budding ideas for this project.  
 As a tourist to the city, there is a palpable desperation for business which 
indicates the struggling nature of the local tourism industry. Following the downing of 
Metrojet flight 9268, the two main countries of origin for tourism to Sharm el Sheikh 
immediately ceased direct flights into the city due to security concerns. The UK and 
Russia provided 4 million tourists to Egypt in 2014, about 40% of all tourist arrivals. This 
long term loss is apparent within the resort. When visiting beaches, cafes and restaurants 
during several trips to Sharm el Sheikh over 2016, I was often the only customer. This 
distinct lack of patrons contrasts sharply to the formerly year round hotel occupancy rates 
of 70%.6  Naama Bay, once the downtown for local nightlife, was characterized by 
 
6 CAPMAS, Nights by Nationality, 2006 - 2015 
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bouncers and café employees waiting for customers who never come. These 
establishments often closed without selling a single drink. In discussing these depressing 
circumstances, locals often mentioned that they were waiting for flights into the city to 
resume, for the return of British and Russian tourists. Russian tourism being especially 
important, workers often stated that it was nearly impossible to make a living in the city 
without learning Russian. Driving through the city, there were more abandoned small 
hotels than those still open and the once thriving open air mall of Mercato seemed vacant 
because of the numerous empty store fronts. The ‘Old City’, a manufactured space dating 
to the mid-1990s, was fashioned after historic markets in other cities. This market, 
created for tourism, featured vendors nervously smoking, while they carefully watched 
the few tourists walking through the area.  
 This study flows from my informal discussions of the hardships faced by informal 
workers in the resort to the regional and national levels through an exploration of how the 
halting of direct flights from Russia and the UK, an unprecedented action, crippled the 
local economy. As a tourist, the human impact left a lasting impression, while as an 
academic, it was natural to think about why this attack devastated the local economy. The 
development and maintenance of the space as a tourist enclave is undeniable when the 
space is compared to other locations within Egypt. Other resorts along the Red Sea and 
the South Sinai cater to domestic tourism, like El Gouna and Dahab, or are functioning 
cities, like Hurghada, which rely on a mix of foreign and domestic tourism from all class 
levels.  
El Gouna, another manufactured tourist space on the Red Sea coast, was carefully 
planned and built with the targeting of domestic elites in mind through the building of 
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luxury villas and flats sold to national and international clientele. Hotels, the marina and 
surrounding areas of the city were zoned to support summer homes and tourism facilities 
together, preventing an oversupply of hotels. Hurghada, which offers facilities with 
multi-tiered price points suitable for international guests and domestic middle class 
tourism, has gone beyond the resort enclave model to become a more complete city with 
resident locals. This model contrasts with Sharm el Sheikh, which forced out the locals 
and destroyed the original village. Other South Sinai locations, like Dahab, Nuweiba and 
Ras Mohamed, are famous for the natural coral reefs and cater to domestic and foreign 
tourism for different class levels: specifically there are budget accommodations attracting 
backpacking tourists from Egypt, Israel and other foreign countries.  
Sharm el Sheikh is unique in conceptualized development seeking the mass 
tourism beach market from the European middle class. The perpetuation of the space for 
this specific tourist consumption has inevitably created the conditions for this long term 
crisis in the tourism industry. In focusing efforts of development for the middle class of 
more wealthy countries, the space became oversupplied in luxury hotels without control 
over demand for these facilities. When the space lost the ability to compete against other 
destinations, through the shock of the terrorist attack, the over reliance on mass beach 
tourism contributed to the crisis of tourism faced by Sharm el Sheikh. 
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1.2 Problems with Stunted Tourism Development: Mass Tourism, Power and the 
Tourism Enclave  
 
 1.2.1  Theory, Power and Tourism Development  
 
 The research questions driving this endeavor focus on the role of power in the 
development of the tourism industry. Structural power in development broadly describes 
tensions between the international economic system, the state and society. 7 This power 
dynamic, the international on the state economy, has led scholars of tourism to use 
development theories in their attempt to ascertain economic benefits of tourism, utilizing 
modernization through macroeconomic analysis, then critiquing this application with 
dependency based arguments complicating the relationship of development and domestic 
tourism industries. This section outlines the development based approaches to the study 
of tourism, especially in regard to power dynamics in the resort enclave model. While 
development theorists once argued that tourism modernized economies and provided an 
avenue for development , critics of this idea argued that tourism often created an unequal 
relationship between the global north and south, especially in the case of resort enclaves.  
 The process of globalization creates an increasingly interconnected world through 
shortened distances, instant communication and spread of information. Globalization 
expressed through tourism has expanded and deepened the dependency of the local on the 
worldwide economy.8  The globalization process increases worldwide tourism by making 
distances smaller and creating more interconnected markets, as well as allowing the 
 
7 Farah, Nadia. “Introduction”. Egypt’s Political Economy: Power Relations in Development. American 
University in Cairo Press. (1990).  
8 Edelman, Marc, and Angelique Haugerud. The Anthropology of Development and Globalization: from 
Classical Political Economy to Contemporary Neoliberalism. Blackwell, (2010).pp 3 
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tourist access to travel large distances.9 Globalization influences local tourism culture 
through the creation of homogenous, inauthentic spaces for consumption by the mass 
tourist.10 The economic benefits of mass tourism to the state encourage the state to 
develop their tourism industries to cater to this demand.  Political globalization impacts 
the sovereignty of nation states through an erosion process which heavily encourages 
compliance to a worldwide standard of creating and operating these tourism markets 
domestically.11 Globalization in economics, politics and culture is inevitable as the world 
shrinks, the local must necessarily make contact with the global, but differing 
development theories emerged to help explain the power dynamics and the benefits of 
this process.   
 Modernization theory was the earliest attempt at a theoretical understanding of the 
process of development. Modernization theory begins with the assumption that cultures 
and societies follow a linear progression and the connection between cultures will bring 
about faster development in the more traditional societies. ‘Traditional’ societies will 
inevitably become like the ‘modern’ societies of the West. Starting from an economic 
perspective, modernization theory expanded to a perspective which includes politics, 
anthropology, and psychology.12 Thus the transition from the traditional to the modern, 
for modernization theorists, included a shift from the rural to the urban, less emphasis on 
family ties, and a move towards modern values and institutions.13 The evolutionary move 
 
9 Allen, John, and Doreen Barbara Massey. Geographical Worlds. Oxford University Press, 1995. 
10Mowforth, Martin, and Ian Munt. Tourism and Sustainability: New Tourism in the Third World. 
Routledge, 1998. p 12. 
11 Ibid 
12 Tefler, David. “The Evolution of Tourism and Development Theory.” Tourism and Development: 
Concepts and Issues, edited by Richard Sharpley and David Tefler, Channel View Publications, 2015., p 40 
13 Ibid 
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from traditional to modern within a country can be helped by the tourism sector within 
the domestic economy. From a modernization perspective tourism could be a 
development strategy which can ‘transfer new technology, increase employment, 
generate foreign exchange, increase GDP and attract development capital’.14 The tourism 
industry was theorized as an economic alternative for states which had not developed 
industrialization, with the mass tourism model being especially helpful in stimulating 
development.15 The mass tourism model could easily help develop states with naturally 
beautiful settings, appealing climates and a surplus of cheap labor.16 ####Modernization 
based approaches to development underpinned integration into the international economy 
through supranational institutions. Tourism was theorized as a method for development 
of global south states who lacked industrialization. Globalization, and the integration of 
the global south into the worldwide economy, was manifested through international 
institutions which granted loans to newly independent states to aid in the development of 
their tourism sectors for mass tourism.17 
 Within states, modernization approaches to development inspired tourism 
industry growth as a means to create a modern state in the absence of democratization; 
this ideology was adopted in Egypt, Greece, the Philippines, Spain and Tunisia.18 For 
cultural development, tourism promotes a modern way of life with western values, and it 
 
14 Tefler, David. “The Evolution of Tourism and Development Theory.” Tourism and Development: 
Concepts and Issues, edited by Richard Sharpley and David Tefler, Channel View Publications, 2015.p 52 
15 Bond, M. and Ladman, J. “International Tourism an instrument for Third World Development” 
Dialectics of Third World Development. 1980.  
16 Bianchi, R. “Towards a new political economy of global tourism” Tourism and Development: Concepts 
and Issues. edited by Richard Sharpley and David Tefler, Channel View Publications, 2015. p 90 
17 Dekadt, E. Tourism: Passport to Development? Perspectives on  the Social and Cultural Effects of 
Tourism in Developing Countries. Oxford University Press. 1979 
18 Bianchi, R. “The Political Economy of Tourism Development: A Critical Review” Annals of Tourism 
Research. 70 (2018) 88-102.  
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can generate rural transformations of traditional societies.19 Not only would tourism 
promote a healthier and faster growing domestic economy, the tourist areas would give 
locals employment and access to understanding the world through interaction with new 
populations.  For early studies focused on macro-level development indicators impacted 
by tourism, modernization helped categorize the move between the poles of traditional 
and modern within a destination country and seemingly stimulated growth in economies 
lacking industrialization.  
 Critics of modernization theory insisted that its linear progression model based on 
western experience was unable to be replicated in the global south. Dependency theorists 
view the macro-economic benefits of mass tourism as inconsequential, as the state will 
never fully develop and integrate internationally through tourism because the tourist 
space is necessarily subjugated to the needs, desires, and whims of the west. 
Modernization theory has been condemned as being a justification for continued 
exploitation of the developing world by western economies.20 Western domination, for 
dependency theorists, is perpetuated because of external and internal political, economic 
and institutional structures within developing countries which keep them in a dependent 
status.21 Theorists within this varied discourse move Marxist critiques of western oriented 
capitalist economics to a more nuanced examination of the characteristics of persistent 
underdevelopment in the global south.22 
 
19 Tefler, David. “The Evolution of Tourism and Development Theory.” Tourism and Development: 
Concepts and Issues, edited by Richard Sharpley and David Tefler, Channel View Publications, 2015.  
quoting the work of Matheison & Wall, 1982; Harrison, 1992; Pi-Sunyer, 1989 
20 Tefler, David. “The Evolution of Tourism and Development Theory.” Tourism and Development: 
Concepts and Issues, edited by Richard Sharpley and David Tefler, Channel View Publications, 2015. p 41 
21 Todaro, Michael P. Economic Development. Pearson Education, 2003. 
22 Tefler, David. “The Evolution of Tourism and Development Theory.” Tourism and Development: 
Concepts and Issues, edited by Richard Sharpley and David Tefler, Channel View Publications, 2015, p 42 
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 The core-periphery model of the world, within dependency literature, asserts an 
unequal relationship between the developed and the developing world. The core 
represents the economic center, where demand and supply originate, which perpetually 
increases power while causing the global south increased dependence on the centralized 
world economy.  The core exploits the periphery’s resources in its pursuit of more 
economic power. Supply is taken through exploitation of the periphery, which is never 
able to share in the benefits of the goods and services. Tourism within the periphery has 
been compared to a plantation economy: the needs of the center are met by developing 
countries who are never able to keep the generated wealth.23 The process of globalization 
in tourism, between powerful and dependent states, necessarily creates uneven and 
unequal development within the global south. The first world receives the most income 
from tourism, are the most often visited and essentially create the demand for tourism.24 
Through the mass tourism model, global south destinations become controlled through 
comprehensive marketing systems and standardized packages created in the core.25 When 
a country is deemed unsafe for travel, global north countries circulate this notion and can 
virtually destroy the tourism industry within the country. Global South countries rely on 
the patronage of the global north, as they have very little other choice in alternative 
tourism markets.26 This unequal power dynamic stems from global north countries 
providing the majority of the worldwide demand for leisure tourism. In this way, these 
 
23 Tefler, David. “The Evolution of Tourism and Development Theory.” Tourism and Development: 
Concepts and Issues, edited by Richard Sharpley and David Tefler, Channel View Publications, 2015. p 54 
24 Mowforth, Martin, and Ian Munt. Tourism and Sustainability: New Tourism in the Third World. 
Routledge, 1998. P 17 
25 Britton, Stephen G. “The Political Economy of Tourism in the Third World.” Annals of Tourism 
Research, 9.3 (1982) pp. 331–358. 
26 Mowforth, Martin, and Ian Munt. Tourism and Sustainability: New Tourism in the Third World. 
Routledge, 1998. P 16-17 
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countries hold both the political and economic power in relation to global south 
destinations.  
 The unequal power relationship in politics and economic structural conditions 
between the global north and south led some scholars examining tourism in the global 
south to reject the view that tourism aids in developing host countries.27Case studies 
focused on small island economies heavily dependent on tourism cite specific examples 
of unequal economic and social impacts of global north tourism on global south states.28  
These studies set the stage for theorists to begin to connect tourism and perpetual 
underdevelopment. Britton’s research on Fiji applies the concepts of dependency to this 
case study and critiques the notion of tourism creating development.29 While tourism is 
believed to be a strategy to generate foreign exchange, increase domestic employment, 
attract outside development capital, and create economic independence for a global south 
state, this is a flawed analysis of the benefits of tourism for the state. The structure of the 
international industry of tourism creates a relationship where the global south state 
remains in a development mode due to commercial power remaining in the hands of 
foreign enterprises.30 Britton demonstrates his conclusions through a three tiered model 
of global south tourism: headquarters, branch offices, and small-scale tourist enterprises. 
 
27 Turner, Louis. “The International Division of Leisure: Tourism and the Third World.” World 
Development, 4.3 (1976) pp. 253–260. 
28 Bryden, John M. Tourism and Development: a Case Study of the Commonwealth Caribbean. Cambridge 
University Press, 1973. 
  --- Hills, Theo L., and Jan Lundgren. “The Impact of Tourism in the Caribbean.” Annals of Tourism 
Research, 4.5 (1977) pp. 248–267. 
  --- Perez, L. “Aspects of Underdevelopment in the West Indies.” Science and Society 37 (1974) pp. 473–
80. 
29 Britton, Stephen G. “The Political Economy of Tourism in the Third World.” Annals of Tourism 
Research, vol. 9, no. 3, 1982, pp. 331–358. 
30 Ibid; Britton, S. “The Spatial Organization of Tourism in a Neo-Colonial Economy: A Fiji Case Study” 
Pacific Viewpoint 21 (1981) 144-65. 
17 
 
Global south tourism destinations become controlled by comprehensive marketing 
systems and standardized packages created in the core.  This dynamic reinforces the 
states dependency on the core and creates a vulnerability towards the developed 
countries. Commercial gains from domestic tourism go to foreign enterprises and 
contribute to the continued underdeveloped nature of the peripheral state.31  
 The dependency perspective on tourism development is furthered through a 
structural example which perpetuates dependence through the expression of economic 
ideals through political institutions. For dependency purists, the structure of the 
international system promotes dependence through forced liberalization by supranational 
institutions and the manifestation of these openings in the tourism sector. The European 
Union, the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and the World Trade 
Organization are among the international community of supranational institutions which 
have the power to directly impact the economies and political decisions of countries in 
the global south. One major example are the structural adjustment programs enforced by 
the IMF and the World Bank after dispensing a loan to a global south country. This 
necessarily changes the economic structure of the state through neoliberal economic 
principles demanding de-nationalization, privatization, and reduction in state services.32 
These changes are externally mandated through the necessity of paying back the loans, 
but make the living conditions within the state harsher for the population.33 Structural 
Adjustment, the means of influence of the international over domestic economies, 
 
31 Britton, Stephen G. “The Political Economy of Tourism in the Third World.” Annals of Tourism 
Research, vol. 9, no. 3, 1982, pp. 331–358. 
32 Mowforth, Martin, and Ian Munt. Tourism and Sustainability: New Tourism in the Third World. 
Routledge, 1998. P 32- 35 
33 Ibid, 291 
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demanded the liberalization of these economies furthering the economic power of the 
transnational and domestic elite.34 Gaining power often occurs due to increased power of 
transnational corporations within the state, with the tourism industry being a prime 
example of this process due to enforced liberalization and privatization.35 This hegemonic 
relationship is often cemented through the active promotion of tourism as a means of 
development, the necessity of building infrastructure to facilitate tourism, receiving 
another loan to pay for this infrastructure, and the application of another round of 
structural adjustments to national fiscal policy to repay this loan.36 This cyclical dynamic 
exemplifies international coercion which perpetuates dependency of the state through the 
promise of development.  
 Structural adjustments affected the political decision making in tourism 
development within Egypt. Contrary to the straightforward relationship between forced 
liberalization and heavily increased foreign domination in the tourism sector, Egypt 
maintained control under the liberalization of the economy partially through the revenues 
generated from the tourism. Under pressure to meet structural adjustments required by 
loans from the IMF in the 1990s, the Mubarak regime resisted quick, sweeping change 
due to the generation of extra revenues from the tourism sector to maintain balance of 
payments and fill in the gaps within the national budget.37 This strategy allowed the 
 
34 Dieke, Peter. “Tourism and Structural Adjustment Programmes in the African Economy.” Tourism 
Economics, 1.1 (1995) pp. 71–93. 
35 Mowforth, Martin, and Ian Munt. Tourism and Sustainability: New Tourism in the Third World. 
Routledge, 1998. p 291 
36 Mowforth, Martin, and Ian Munt. Tourism and Sustainability: New Tourism in the Third World. 
Routledge, 1998 
37 Richter, Thomas and Christian Steiner. “Politics, Economics and Tourism Development in Egypt: 
Sectoral Transformations of a Neo-patrimonial rentier state” Third World Quarterly 29.5 (2008): 939 – 
959. 
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regime to make changes along its own schedule. Enjoying the benefits from the industry, 
the regime sought to increase revenues through diversifying sources for tourism.38 
Conceptualization of resort development on the Red Sea and Sinai emanated from the 
desire to increase revenues, with mass package tourism identified as the most profitable 
market to target. Privatization of tourist facilities was required by the IMF, but had been 
planned a decade prior, as the regime recognized that the industry would experience 
growth and higher efficiency under the private sector. While conceptualizing the future 
resorts of the South Sinai, Egypt concurrently implemented planned privatization of the 
industry. 
 
 1.2.2  Mass Tourism and the Dependent Resort Enclave 
 
 The rejection of modernization as applicable in the global south and the critiques 
of neoliberalism as perpetuating dependency allow for a more nuanced understanding of 
the inequality in power between the developing state and globalizing forces, one which 
perpetuates chronic underdevelopment. The examination of power relationships between 
the global north and global south have extended to the application of concepts of 
colonialist and imperialist forms of domination to the area of tourism. Early theoretical 
models of the developed world vacationing in the developing world describe the 
‘pleasure periphery’, sun and sea locations short flights away from the industrialized 
core, built to serve the needs of the new emerging middle class.39 Tourism turns global 
 
38 Ibid; Brown, Frances and Derek Hall “Tourism and Development in the Global South: The Issues” Third 
World Quarterly 29.5 (2008) 839-849. 
39 Turner, Louis, and John Ash. The Golden Hordes: International Tourism and the Pleasure Periphery. St. 
Martin's Press, 1976.    
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south cultures into commodities and these spaces become a ‘hedonistic playground’ for 
the comparatively wealthy foreigner.40 Tourism as imperialism arguments insist that 
power remains in the core: the core creates the tourist demand and the tourists 
themselves.41  Tourism is an expression of colonialism in the sense that it promotes the 
dynamic of domination/subjugation42 and recreates the master-slave relationship between 
the tourist and the host society.43  
 Cultural dependency, as theorized through these writings on imperialism and 
colonialism, is epitomized by the mass tourism model. This form of tourism creates a 
homogenized package for the tourist desiring a specific kind of holiday. Mass tourism 
represents an older style of tourism characterized by Fordism (economic and social 
systems based on mass production and mass consumption), packaged, standardized, and 
irresponsible. Globalization influences local tourism culture through the creation of 
homogenous, inauthentic spaces for consumption by the mass tourist.44 Internal political 
processes are impacted through an erosion of sovereignty and the necessary compliance 
with worldwide standards of operating these spaces.45 This form of tourism seeks the 
sand, sea, sun and usually sex with a disregard for what is culturally, socially and 
environmentally responsible.46 
 
40 Van den Abbeele, G. “Sightseers: The Tourist as Theorist .” Diacritics 10 (1980) pp. 3–14. 
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44Mowforth, Martin, and Ian Munt. Tourism and Sustainability: New Tourism in the Third World. 
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45 Ibid p 12 
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 Resort development in the Middle East during the 1970s was characterized by 
mass production to meet the mass consumption of the era.47 Twenty years later, the 
development of Sharm el Sheikh followed the models of other resort development which 
occurred on the Mediterranean Coast in North Africa. Diverging from the traditional 
dependency relationship espoused by theorists examining global south resorts, domestic 
business elite invested in tourism facilities within Sharm el Sheikh and retain ownership 
due to legal regulations in the Sinai. This heavy investment was encouraged by 
government policies designed for rapid development. The government and domestic 
elites exercised agency in the building of these resorts along the projected future demand 
of European clientele. Despite this major difference in the models of dependency in other 
states tourism sectors, the mass tourism model and the inherent dependency on the needs 
and desires of the western tourist characterize the tourism space of Sharm el Sheikh. 
 Sharm el Sheikh embodies the resort enclave meant to serve the needs of mass 
tourism. The remote city is contained by natural borders of the sea and a mountain range 
with checkpoint controlled entry along the two roads into the space. The shoreline was 
bought early by domestic businessmen, zoned for tourism and developed as closed 
beached for numerous luxury hotels, with local workers needing to travel outside the city 
to visit public beaches. The entirety of the Naama Bay shoreline is contained as private 
beaches for hotels, and a manufactured city center was developed behind the hotels, with 
clubs, restaurants and open air cafes. Three additional manufactured spaces were created 
for shopping, the ‘Old City’ designed to emulate historic markets, Soho Square and 
 
47 Hazbun, Waleed. “Fordism on the Beach.” Beaches, Ruins, Resorts: the Politics of Tourism in the Arab 
World. University of Minnesota Press, (2008). pp8 
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Mercato were private developments attached to hotels offering several shopping and 
dining options. Private residences are few and lack beach access, with Delta Sharm being 
predominately rented to individual tourists. The city proper contains only residents who 
work within the tourism industry, as the original local population was moved out of the 
area and Bedouins are restricted from entering the city.  Within the enclave, tourists 
arrive to the destination and are transported directly to the closed off area created for 
them.48 Separate from the host community and not meant to benefit the local 
community.49 The foreign tourist is unlikely to move outside of the walls of the enclave 
area. Segregation between the tourist and the local population occurs, which represents a 
form of neo-colonialization.50 The city was conceptualized for the mass beach tourist, and 
relied heavily upon tours organized from European markets. Although the resort’s 
ownership largely remains with domestic businessmen, a unique feature against other 
resort enclaves, the space was built to serve the desires of mass beach tourism. 
 Resort enclave development occurs to meet a demand and experiences an 
eventual decline due to the inability to continue to meet that need.51 This process of 
development, stagnation and decline was conceptualized by Richard Butler in 1980 as the 
‘resort cycle’, modeled after the classic writings within business on life cycles of a 
product.52 Several characteristics of Sharm el Sheikh before the bombing of Metrojet 
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flight 9268 coincide with the stagnation phase of Butler’s model: large spaces were 
specifically built to cater towards tourism activities, these facilities were characterized by 
inauthenticity, a decline in image from fashionable to outdated occurred, the resort 
heavily relied on repeat visitation coming from mass based tourism, and Bedouin locals 
were excluded from the development process.53 Oversupply ensued, surpassing demand 
and local capacity. With exceeded capacity, the quality of experience degrades causing 
decline in visitation, lending less resources to maintenance of the resort.54 The resort 
cycle has highly influenced the understanding of the process of resort development and 
decline, and has been applied in many differing contexts.55 Within the context of Sharm 
el Sheikh, this modeling demonstrates the extent to which the space is dependent on 
tourism stemming from the mass beach tourism market, with inevitable decline without 
diversification away from this reliance.56 Sharm el Sheikh met several required features 
for the consolidation and stagnation phases according to Butler, warning potential decline 
without intervention. 
 The mass tourism model, and the resort enclave it creates in the global south, 
represents an outdated modern form of tourism. A shift is occurring between this modern 
form to a postmodern model of tourism which is individualized, post-fordist, flexible 
(unpackaged), real and more responsible to the local community.57 This shift allows for 
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tourism to be less of a commoditizing force to a destination, as the homogenous resort is 
replaced by a tourist space which is not divorced from the local community and 
environment. The mass tourist, in new tourism, is exchanged with the individual seeking 
understanding of local cultures and authenticity of experience.58  This shift is not relevant 
to the current state of the resort of Sharm el Sheikh, which epitomizes the mass tourist 
model of the resort enclave and is unlikely to develop into a space catering to new forms 
of authentic, sustainable tourism. 
  
 1.2.3 Contextualizing the Tourism Sector in Egypt 
 
 Integral to the structure of the Egyptian economy, tourism represents a means of 
gaining foreign currency, maintaining balance of payments in trade, and providing 
employment for 2.1 million Egyptians in 2014 (over 8% of total employment 
nationally).59 The Mubarak regime recognized the benefits of the tourism industry and 
sought to encourage growth within the sector while pursuing measured privatization 
required by the International Monetary Fund. While neoliberalism based economics 
backed the changes pushed by the international community, Mubarak scheduled 
privatization of state owned industry, including publicly held hotels, tourism companies 
and the state airline, in a three stage approach. While this process of privatization had 
little effects on the South Sinai, as it had barely begun its development journey at this 
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time, it laid the foundations for the government’s approach toward development in the 
territory.  
 There are divergent opinions on the government’s role in development in the 
tourism sector. Matthew Gray and the work of Thomas Richter and Christian Steiner 
complicate the traditional understanding of neoliberalism in Egypt through their insertion 
of national politics into the changes made during the structural adjustment reforms. For 
Gray, the dual processes of privatization and liberalization are evident within Egypt’s 
tourism sector, and were largely successful until the late 1990s when his study was 
published. Privatization pushed profitable enterprises out of the hands of the public 
sector, which resulted in negligible financial benefits for the state.60 Liberalization within 
the tourism industry pursued by the Mubarak government sought rapid expansion with 
the perception that this development would provide much more benefits than harms for 
the state.  
 Gray assessed that that the tourism sector in Egypt, once a sector with exponential 
growth, illuminates the dangers of widespread privatization with little strategic planning 
on the part of the government. Grays’ study, published in 1998, warns of a possible 
collapse in the tourist sector through unrestrained growth, lack of strategy, and loss of 
control by the government. Gray warns of the dangers of the ‘Tourist Cycle’: ‘where a 
destination becomes destroyed or damaged by tourism to such an extent that tourists no 
longer want to visit it’.61 This process occurs due to a lack of planning creating damage to 
the environment, dissatisfaction from locals, rapid social and economic change, an 
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inequity in economic distribution, and an over-supply in the sector leading to 
unemployment and loss in investments.62 This work illuminates a burgeoning problem 
within the tourist sector due to unplanned and unrestrained growth. 
 Gray’s observations, following his chronological study of privatization and 
liberalization within Egypt’s national tourism industry, are updated by this present study. 
His warning of the dangers of collapse due to lack of planning and oversupply within the 
industry did not come into fruition nationally, but when evaluating the current crisis of 
Sharm el Sheikh, the dangers of the tourist cycle are evident. Sharm el Sheikh developed 
in a wholly different way, is reliant upon one form of tourism, and the building of 
facilities had a trajectory unmatched in the development of facilities in other cities. While 
the target market for the space was conceptualized by the government, it was left to the 
private sector to carve out tourism facilities without central planning or control. 
 Richter and Steiner’s work characterize the Egyptian state as a neo-patrimonial 
rentier state, which actively chose development strategies in the midst of neoliberal 
economic reforms. Opposing traditional understandings of neoliberalism in its ability to 
reduce reliance on rentier style economics, Egypt offers an example of a maintenance of 
rentier economics stemming from the privatization of the tourism industry. Liberalization 
in Egypt occurred alongside the encouragement of development and investment in 
tourism capabilities leading to a continuation of rentier economics.63 This important 
observation on tourism development lends itself to the overarching understanding of the 
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mentality of the government: in place of encouraging development in multiple domestic 
industries, the tourism sector was emphasized as a means of gaining foreign exchange 
earnings and overcoming balance of payment issues which originally ushered in the need 
for neoliberal economic reforms. This emphasis on rapid development is demonstrated by 
the selling of publically owned land in the South Sinai to the domestic elite and the 
encouragement of quickly creating tourism capacities in the space.  
 Tourism policies of the Mubarak regime centered upon maximizing Egypt’s 
abilities to attract visitors and investments, ensuring the continued reliance on the sector 
for economic stability. Privatization and liberalization of tourism in Egypt occurred 
alongside the fledgling conceptualization of the tourism space of the South Sinai. While 
neoliberalism influenced the changes made by the regime, it is important to insert 
domestic politics and the choices made internally. The government slowly privatized the 
industry, chose to diversify tourism through development of beach resorts, and 
strategically encouraged private investment in tourism as a way to stabilize the national 
economy and resist rapid neoliberal change.  
 
 1.2.4 Complicating the Connection: Tourism after Terrorism 
 
 Tourism in Egypt has produced substantial economic benefits to the state, but has 
been subject to fluctuations due to the threat of political violence. The impact of political 
violence on tourism has been heavily studied, both in the Egyptian context and in other 
international cases to conclude that political violence and terrorist attacks have a 
significant ability to harm tourism within a state. Tourism in Egypt has historically 
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recovered from political violence quicker than other destinations in the Middle East.64 
The case of the downing of Metrojet flight 9268 stands as an outlier to this trend. 
 Studies exploring the connection between tourism and terrorism within the recent 
history of Egypt demonstrate an inverse relationship between terrorist attacks and tourism 
while complicating this relationship. In looking at the interconnected nature of economics 
and politics in Egypt in the mid-1990s, Cassandra emphasizes the danger of political 
violence specifically for employment and income distribution due to the increasing 
reliance on tourism as a means of generating revenues within the state.65 This concern for 
internal dynamics was important during the time of writing, but the tourism industry 
experienced growth following these fluctuations. The current case examined within this 
work can relate to those early fears due to the significant loss of business experienced, 
especially in the South Sinai.  
 Potential tourists engage in destination substitution when faced with unstable 
conditions in a possible holiday destination. Other locations are visited in response to 
violent attacks on tourists (but not to local tensions) and European guests are extremely 
sensitive to Egyptian government crackdown on Islamist opposition, which has a further 
impact on these tourist’s decision making.66 This surprising assertion indicates that both 
terrorist violence and government response combine to prolong the loss in tourism 
experienced by the state. In the case of Sharm el Sheikh, this indicates that the 
government must be extremely careful, while it historically pursued strong tactics to 
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decrease terrorist violence, it must acknowledge tourist perceptions of these strategies. 
This research also partially explains, along with the attack itself, why the loss in tourism 
has lasted this long. Not only was this one of the largest attacks against tourists, 
encouraging them to choose other destinations in the future, but the violent response by 
the government also turned European tourists away.  
 Adding to this assertion, that violent government reaction affects tourism arrivals 
alongside terrorist attacks, a quantitative study conducted by Neumayer demonstrates that 
the political system itself affects tourism.  Autocracies in general receive less foreign 
tourists against their more democratic competitors, even without widespread crackdowns 
and politically motivated violence. The addition of human rights violations and active 
conflict further compounds the loss in tourism experienced by the state. Substantial 
increases in political violence lower tourist arrivals by one fourth globally, while if the 
country manages to end politically motivated violence and changes their perception 
within the international media, then tourism can regain previous momentum.67 These 
works demonstrate that government actions also affect tourism indicators, complicating 
the notion that terrorism alone negatively impact tourism.  
 Long term political instability can have more significant effects on a country’s 
tourism industry than single incident terrorist attacks. Furthermore, countries that 
experience high levels of political risk endure significant reductions in tourism.68 The 
political environment within Egypt can be considered a high risk political atmosphere 
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within the parameters of this study due to political repression, continual terrorism 
incidents and violent political change within the last five years. This atmosphere of 
political instability, coupled with the terrorist attack in Sharm el Sheikh, should have 
produced a decline in the tourist sector nationally and within the city itself.  
 The resort enclave model presents several challenges when coupled with long 
term political instability and violence. This is due to the high possibility for tourists to 
engage in destination substitution due to the highly substitutable features of resorts. 
Before diversification of tourism in Egypt, the destination held competitive advantages 
against other destinations due to its unique features. If the destination holds unique 
characteristics (such as Egyptian pharaonic history), then tourists are unlikely to 
substitute this destination for another despite political violence. However, if a 
destination’s characteristics are able to be substituted easily (such as sunny, warm 
beaches and nice nightlife) then it is particularly vulnerable to substitution by tourists if 
they are faced with political violence and risk.69 Tourists choose alternate destinations 
when political conditions appear to be unstable.70 Additionally following terrorist attacks, 
tourists prefer to spend 25% less on vacations to the destination.71  Following these 
conditions, Egypt’s characteristics are not easily substituted, so tourism as a whole should 
recover following political violence. However, when discussing a tourist enclave such as 
Sharm el Sheikh, where visitors fly in to enjoy a beach holiday without excursions into 
Cairo or Luxor, political violence should have a different effect. These features of the 
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resort enclave are easily substituted with safer destinations where European tourists can 
enjoy the beach without fear of terrorism or other forms of political violence. Crisis 
management for resort enclaves is critical following the destabilizing forces of political 
violence and instability.  
 Crisis management following political violence in tourism destinations presents 
an alternate place where states lack control. Domestic tourism is affected by the spillover 
effect, especially with western tourism in the Middle East. This effect shows decline in 
western tourism in the region with incidents of political violence, which is attributed to 
the conflated idea of risk in the region.72 The perception of instability within a 
destination, can persuade tourists to choose other destinations, while foreign governments 
and media can perpetuate the idea of danger in a global south destination.73 External 
negative images of the liberation struggles and subsequent coups in African states 
severely damaged their burgeoning tourism sectors.74 The media coverage of crisis and 
violence in destinations have been shown to be sensationalized and highly negative, 
while the viewers interpretation of events is more incoherent with further distance to the 
destination country.75 The issuing of security advisories against travel to certain countries 
allows the first world to determine where tourists should travel. These advisories are 
highly political in nature, dependent upon the relationships between states: states with 
 
72 Hazbun, Waleed. ‘Explaining the Arab Middle East Tourism Paradox’ Arab World Geographer 9(3) 
(2006) 201-214. p 203 
73 Mowforth, Martin, and Ian Munt. Tourism and Sustainability: New Tourism in the Third World. 
Routledge, (1998). p 282. 
74 Teye, V. ‘Liberation Wars and Tourism Development in Africa: The Case of Zambia’ Annals of Tourism 
Research 13 (1986) 589 - 608 
75 Ritchie, Brent et al. “Tourism Crises and Disasters: Moving the Research Agenda Forward” The Wiley 
Blackwell Companion to Tourism (2014) 
32 
 
better relations with a first world country have a higher threshold of danger to tourists to 
warrant formal warnings.76 
 These studies problematize what would otherwise be a straightforward 
relationship between terrorism and decline in tourism. Government reaction and 
government type, along with human rights violations and political violence, work 
alongside single acts of terror to dissuade vacation goers from choosing a destination, 
with European tourists being especially sensitive to violence perpetrated by the 
government.  If the country is experiencing heightened political risk through consecutive 
acts of violence, the loss of tourism is prolonged. Destinations which do not have unique 
features, are particularly vulnerable following political violence because vacationers are 
highly likely to engage in destination substitution. 
 
1.3  Research Questions 
 
 This project seeks to explore the creation of the tourism space of the Sharm El 
Sheikh: the purpose of the space, the policies implemented to stimulate tourism in the 
area, and the contribution of this development to future instability of the tourism sector in 
the area. This project broadly views government development policies as the independent 
variable and the vulnerability to crisis within the tourism sector as the dependent variable. 
To explore the relationship between these variables, four research questions have been 
developed. The research questions driving this inquiry focus on the relationship of 
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government policy and development and seek to understand the vulnerabilities which 
emerged from the dual forces of development policy and political instability.   
 
 Research Question A. Why did the Mubarak Regime and economic elites 
seek to develop tourism in the South Sinai? What were the economic benefits of the 
design and rapid development of this tourism space? 
 Hypothesis A. Tourism development in the South Sinai provided the state with 
macroeconomic benefits, at a time when mainland tourism faced instability due to 
terrorism. This development was an opportunity to entrench the regime through 
patronage, job creation and economic stability. Tourism Revenues have proven to be an 
extremely important source of foreign currency for the state, providing stability in hard 
currency necessary to maintain a positive balance of payments. This extra revenue 
provided the state with leeway within national budgets, allowing the Mubarak regime to 
choose the timing of the implementation of harsh economic reforms required by the IMF 
during the 1990s. The regime resisted outside pressure for fiscal change, despite the 
fluctuations in tourism revenues throughout the decade due to terrorist violence. The 
policies of diversification of tourism into the sun/sand resorts of the Sinai was an 
effective strategy to gain stability in tourism revenues through a space removed from 
terrorist activity. The regime encouraged rapid development of these new tourism spaces 
to regain stability in tourism revenues, thus maintaining the overall political stability of 
the regime itself.  
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 Research Question B.   How did the planned target market for tourism create 
an initial vulnerability to changing external demand?  
 Hypothesis B.  The early planning for the resort spaces of the South Sinai 
deliberately target the European mass tourism market. This market was targeted due to 
the perceived growth of demand, the relative wealth and proximity, and the perceived 
stability in this form of tourism. However, this targeting ultimately led to several 
problems in the later development of the South Sinai according to the stages of the 
Tourism Area Life Cycle modeled by the work of Richard Butler.77 This highly 
influential model of resort development outlines the linear stages of growth and decline 
of a tourism space, with several criteria for each of the models five stages. Sharm El 
Sheikh developed in line with this model and exemplified the stagnation point, the stage 
before decline.  Supply outgrew demand, internal and external competition drove down 
prices which led to a lower level of tourist frequenting the resort. Overuse and poor 
planning has begun to cause ecological damage and the design of the tourism spaces have 
led to a resort model which is divorced from the local environment. The degradation of 
the space and the level of tourist, coupled with current political instability has threatened 
this territory’s ability to remain globally competitive.  
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 Research Question C. What is the relationship between the created tourism 
space and local populations? 
 The South Sinai is populated with Bedouin whose livelihoods required full range 
of the environment along with access to the coast for fishing. These small communities 
were pushed away from the coast through the demarcation of these spaces for tourism 
and the eventual building of the resorts. These populations were excluded from the 
planning process and the ability to gain revenues through the sale of the land to elites and 
the control of the territory by security forces (especially in the case of Sharm El Sheikh). 
They are systematically excluded from tourism related activities and are not employed 
formally in the tourism sector. This exclusion of local populations has created distrust 
and deepened social isolation between the Sinai and mainland Egypt.  
 
 Research Question D. Has recent political instability changed tourism 
dynamics in the South Sinai? 
 Hypothesis D. Terrorist actions have impacted tourism arrivals and revenues 
through the 1990s and early 2000s in Egypt. Tourism to Egypt has also been subjected to 
instability through the spillover effect: instability in neighboring countries leading to 
drops in tourism domestically; as well as negative image transfer following the long-term 
instability created by the 2011 uprising. Following the regime change, central control 
over the Sinai deteriorated, creating a space for the entrenchment of terrorist elements 
within the territory. The heavy handed security policy of the state, in the attempt to both 
regain control and punish terrorists responsible for the downing of Metrojet flight 9268,  
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has created a protracted conflict in the North and has perpetrated the negative image of 
instability of the Sinai peninsula. Further impacting the recovery of tourism, external 
governments and travel agents remain in almost total control of image repair in the 
placement of travel warnings (from governments) and decreased bookings (agents).  
 
 These four research questions seek to understand the active creation and 
development of the tourism industry of the South Sinai in terms of benefits to the 
government and the economic elites within the country. Question A focuses on the 
conceptualization of the tourism space and locates this vision in the context of the 
political climate in Egypt in the 1990s. This question attempts to ascertain how the 
regime used tourism development to resist neoliberal economic changes, which were 
viewed as a potential destabilizing force within society during the period. This question 
also seeks to map the policies implemented by the regime which encouraged rapid 
development through the investments of private elites in multiple ways. Question B 
forwards the overarching hypothesis of this work through the specific analysis of the 
targeted market of the mass beach tourism for this envisioned tourism space in the South 
Sinai. The current vulnerability witnessed in the tourism industry is found in the specific 
targeting of the European mass based tourism market, due to a lack of control over 
demand for Sharm El Sheikh as a destination. This lack control in demand stems from 
economic conditions, the inability to compete with other similar destinations, and 
political conditions, the lack of power to change the perception of risk to tourists in the 
South Sinai.  
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 Question C focuses on the government’s policies of both exclusion of the Bedouin 
population in seizing the land for tourism and in encouraging migration of workers to the 
newly created space from the main Egyptian population. This dynamic has impoverished 
the Bedouin, encouraging sedentarization while severely limiting their ability to sustain 
themselves through tourism based endeavors. This question also attempts to distinguish 
between the extreme disparity in development between the North and South Sinai, which 
is often cited as a main cause of the continued conflict on the peninsula and the 
entrenchment of terrorist organizations within the territory. This dynamic can be 
considered a vulnerability created through early planning for tourism.  
 Question D places the current climate of instability on the peninsula in relation to 
the crisis in tourism faced by Sharm El Sheikh. Following the revolution and the 
degradation of control of the central government over the Sinai, the tourism industry was 
inevitably impacted. Additionally, the bombing of Metrojet flight 9268 effectively halted 
tourism to the area, with the distinct lack of control by the central Egyptian government 
over regaining tourism to the region. This lack of control in regaining tourism is due to 
external governments halting flights, the placement of security warnings for travel to the 
Sinai, and ultimately cost/benefit decision making on the part of potential tourists and 
tourism agents in Europe.  
 
1.4  Methodology 
 
 This qualitative case study analyzes government policy related decision making in 
historic context and illuminates problems in the developmental foundation of the tourism 
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sector in the South Sinai. As previously mentioned, the independent variable of this 
project is tourism development policy with the dependent variable as the vulnerability to 
instability created by this policy. Different facets of the independent variable are 
operationalized through each of the research questions. 
 Research Question A necessitates a case study of specific development plans in 
the beginning stages of resort building in the territory. Several documents are used in 
sketching the history of policy. The first major wave of planning occurred with the Sinai 
Development Study from USAID- a 1985 analysis of resources, potential population 
relocation from central Egypt to the Sinai, proposed tourism sites, and necessary 
infrastructure for future development. This report sets the tone for development and 
illuminates the driving vision for the reacquired peninsula. The historic evidence for 
tourism policy is furthered with the next report commissioned by The South Sinai 
Governorate Environmental Action Plan in 2003. This development profile allows a look 
at the rapid expansion of tourist facilities and creates an opportunity for comparison 
between the early planning and the actual policies implemented by the state. Additional 
points of comparison between actual development and early planning is provided by the 
Sustainable Tourism Development Plan for the South Sinai commissioned by EuropeAid 
in 2008 and the Assessment of the Tourism Sector in Egypt, a study conducted by 
USAID in 2012.  
 These points of reference for policy and development require political context to 
further the assertion that these policies were deliberately planned in relation to the 
political climate in the 1990s and early 2000s. In the effort to provide this context, a 
survey of the Middle East Economic Digest was conducted. This weekly digest 
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chronicles political changes, economic conditions and advertises tenders for new projects 
throughout the region. This digest is utilized to show specific economic and political 
conditions faced by the Mubarak regime and the political choices made to quickly 
develop the capacities for tourism in the South Sinai.  
 This method of tracing the development of the space utilizes government studies 
alongside the weekly Middle East Economic Digest in the effort to create an unbiased 
economic history of the space, while attempting to understand motivations of the 
government’s plans through detailed reporting on development planning and future 
targets. This data is more reliable than informant interviews, as it does not rely on 
memory and is not sourced from economic elites who might be biased in interviews. This 
method also provides data on hotel numbers, occupancy, and tourist arrivals, while 
providing snapshots of developmental challenges facing the resort. This form of data 
collection is better for analysis seeking to cover two decades, which could not be 
accurately gathered through informant interviewing.  
 Research Question B focuses on the problematic targeting of the mass beach 
tourism in the planned resorts of the South Sinai. This section relies on the criteria of the 
Tourism Area Life Cycle proposed by the work of Butler and expanded upon by tourism 
literature. This model shows the development and decline of tourism spaces through 
distinct phases. This model exposes the problematic targeting of mass tourism, with the 
phase associated with this market as being the final point before decline. The evidence 
for this research question relies upon the literature associated with this model paired with 
descriptions of problems facing Sharm El Sheikh and the South Sinai before the terrorist 
attack of 2015. The evidence of the emerging problems within the tourism space comes 
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from the reports detailed in Research Question A, conducted by EuropeAid in 2008 and 
USAID in 2012 with the addition of a 2009 report from the Egyptian Center for 
Economic Studies entitled, Tourism in Egypt: An Unfinished Business. Selected statistics 
from CAPMAS (Central Agency for Public Mobilization and Statistics) and the Egyptian 
Ministry of Tourism are used to show changing tourism arrivals and changing hotel 
occupancy within the South Sinai in the last fifteen years.  
 This portion relies on several of the same studies utilized to create the economic 
history for Research Question A. The addition of the Tourism Area Life Cycle as a means 
to understand the development path of the resort, along with selected statistics from the 
Egyptian government creates the analysis of vulnerabilities in the resort. The use of the 
Tourism Area Life Cycle has precedence in many studies on tourism development, 
although it has been critiqued as being linear, and altered by Butler. This application also 
relies on the conceptualization of Sharm el Sheikh as a resort city, however, this chapter 
will present the argument for this classification for this tourism space. The use of tourism 
statistics from the Egyptian state is notoriously problematic in some reports are missing 
numbers, the classifications within some reports are vague, and in a few cases there are 
discrepancies between different reports. These challenges limit the ability to do strong 
quantitative work with these figures. However, almost all of the literature on tourism in 
Egypt cites these government statistics, as there are no alternatives to this data.  
 Social Divisions created through tourism development policy are the focus of 
Research Question C. This portion of the independent variable is operationalized through 
a survey of anthropological studies of the Bedouin of the South Sinai. Hilary Gilbert, an 
anthropologist studying the changing social dynamics of this population, published two 
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works, Nature=Life Environmental Identity as Resistance in South Sinai and ‘This is Not 
Our Life, It’s Just a Copy of Other People’s’: Bedu and the Price of ‘Development’ in the 
South Sinai, which allow the present research to survey ethnographic perspectives on the 
changing social and physical landscape due to tourism development. Goodman’s book, 
Contesting Identities in South Sinai: Development, Transformation and the Articulation 
of a ‘Bedouin’ Identity under Egyptian Rule, Karbaki’s article Lifestyle Migration in 
South Sinai, Egypt: Nationalism, Privileged Citizenship and Indigenous Rights, and 
Yasmine Ramadan’s literary analysis, National or Not?: Tal’it al-badan and the 
Bedouins of Sinai,  all come together to enrich the present projects’ understanding of the 
tensions between nationalism and identity in the state’s development project in the South 
Sinai.  This survey of ethnographies on the South Sinai Bedouin contextualize the 
changing economic conditions faced by the population, the impacts of government policy 
making in development and the social changes endured as the population contends with 
the ‘modernizing’ force of the state’s economic vision for the territory.  
 Research Question D shifts the focus from development to examine security 
policy and its relationship to the stability of the tourism sector. The terrorism threatening 
the strength of tourism in Egypt during the 1990s will be analyzed using reporting in the 
Middle East Economic Digest and through case study literature on the impact of this 
violence on tourism indicators. The security policies pursued by the Mubarak Regime 
will be discussed, as they stand as an important counterpart to the strategy of tourism 
diversification examined through Research Question A. The threat of terrorism targeting 
the tourism industry changed focus to the Sinai and intensified from the 1990s to the 
2000s, and a renewal of conflict occurred with the regime change which occurred after 
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the 2011 Uprising. The evidence for these changing policies and the escalation of 
violence are detailed using news reports from the New York Times, The Economist and 
the Washington Post. Conflict analysis from the Council of Foreign Relations, the Middle 
East Institute and the International Crisis Group add analytic perspectives on the 
changing nature of policy and conflict in the Sinai.  
 The quantitative data for this portion relies on figures from the Ministry of 
Tourism and CAPMAS, which present some challenges discussed above: missing figures, 
discrepancies and unclear classifications. This limitation is faced by every study looking 
at tourism in Egypt, as there are no alternatives to this official data. This section 
examines political instability and violence, however these terms present a further 
limitation to our study: it is very difficult to operationalize ‘political risk’, ‘violence’, or 
‘instability’ with quantitative figures due to missing information to create these variables. 
Furthermore, the successive points of political change and violence lessen the ability to 
make causal connections between specific periods and change in consumer demand, 
change in tourism and change in competitiveness of the destination. This limitation 
lessons the ability to draw specific causal connections of individual acts of violence or 
moments of instability, however this project views the political climate and the conflict in 
the Sinai holistically, which allows for conclusions on the vulnerability of the tourism 
space.  
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2.  SHARM EL SHEIKH AS A DEPENDENT RESORT 
 
 
  This chapter addresses the first two research questions: Why did the Mubarak 
Regime and economic elites seek to develop tourism in the South Sinai? What were the 
economic benefits of the design and rapid development of this tourism space? How did 
the planned target market for tourism create an initial vulnerability to changing external 
demand? These questions center on the motivations of the Mubarak regime and the 
economic elite in designing and rapidly building tourism spaces in the South Sinai. This 
development sought economic stability when terrorism threatened the security of the 
industry in Mainland Egypt, while allowing the regime to resist rapid structural 
adjustments mandated by the International Monetary Fund. This chapter narrates the 
economic history of the rise of the resort, and the almost inevitable decline of the space. 
The diversification into mass beach tourism significantly bolstered Egyptian tourism for a 
time, however, the reliance on the mass beach tourism model presented a vulnerability to 
changing external demand, a process which is modeled by Butler’s Tourism Area 
Lifecycle. This process of stagnation and decline within the South Sinai has been 
accelerated by terrorism and political instability, a point which will be further expanded 
upon within the chapter ‘Political Instability and Managing Tourism: Creation and 
Compromise of the New Tourism Space’.  
 The next section, ‘Designing for the Mass Beach Tourism’ outlines the initial 
planning for tourism development of the reacquired Sinai. This section contextualizes this 
planning with the economic environment which motivated diversification in the tourism 
industry and begins the assertion that Sharm el Sheikh was designed for the mass tourism 
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market. ‘Fordist Momentum’ traces the exponential growth in tourism capabilities of the 
resort over the 1990s and early 2000s, while highlighting some of the emerging problems 
facing Sharm el Sheikh as a result of specifically building for the mass tourism market. 
‘Structuralism on the Resort’ focuses on the economic and public policies which have 
contributed to the creation and maintenance of this resort. ‘Choosing Dependency and the 
Life Cycle of Sharm el Sheikh’ acts as a concluding section for this chapter which draws 
on the data presented in the proceeding sections to argue for the classification of this 
tourism space as a resort enclave. It seeks to compare the dependency theorist’s critiques 
of resort development in the global south with the case of Sharm el Sheikh and utilizes 
Butler’s Tourist Area Life Cycle to highlight vulnerabilities present in the resort.  
 
2.1  Designing for the Mass Beach Tourist  
 
 The privatization of the tourism industry in the early 1980s led to a general 
rethinking of this industry. The government sought to expand revenues by transferring 
costs to the private sector and reorienting future investment into resort development, an 
expansion into a new kind of tourism apart from the traditional focus on historical sites.78 
Ushering in this diversification, fifteen tourist villages were planned on the Red Sea 
coast, to be constructed by international companies and to be financed through forty year 
leases by outside companies.79 This new emphasis on other forms of tourism had the 
 
78 Middle East Economic Digest. 10 OCT 1980. p 29 
79 Middle East Economic Digest. 5 DEC 1980. p 26 
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Ministry focused on the Sinai before negotiations were complete on the handover from 
Israel.80 
 Under Israeli control until 1979, the Sinai was part of negotiations for peace in the 
treaty between Israel and Egypt. Egypt gained control over the area in six stages, with 
Sharm el Sheikh as part of the final turnover in April 1982.81 Sharm el Sheikh was a 
small, underdeveloped fishing community with very few hotels and attractions. This 
space represented an economic opportunity in diversifying tourism in Egypt beyond 
archeological attractions. During the transition of the Sinai, development consultants 
from USAID and government officials were optimistic about the huge potential of the 
tourism industry in the south.82   
 One recommendation that was made at this stage was tapping into the emerging 
market of ‘Warm Water Beach Tourism’ defined as relatively high income visitors from 
Europe seeking year round warm beaches.83 Identified as the fastest growing tourist 
market, figures from this period estimated a future 200 million holiday trips from top 
European markets. European tour operators projected that the Sinai could reasonably 
expect capture 4 to 6 percent market share by 1990. This assessment forecasted 8 to 12 
million holidays to the South Sinai. Consultants from USAID promoted a more 
conservative estimate of .6 to 1.7 million visitor days in 1990.  
 This market share, whether looking at the optimistic potential or the more 
conservative estimate promoted by the report, hinged on the ability to develop the 
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physical infrastructure to cater to future tourist demand. Facilities needed to be 
constructed on time and run efficiently to meet expectations of foreign visitors. 
Consultants writing about these potentials in 1983 recognized that further feasibility 
studies needed to be conducted along with detailed market planning and investigation of 
private sector partners. However, they proposed the high potential of catering to warm 
water tourism and recommended that resorts planned in the area be large scaled, 
ascetically pleasing, and have the ability to command respect because of the highly 
competitive nature of the industry. The resort emphasizes that anything less than the best 
in resorts and other facilities would be a short term gain for the country, while sacrificing 
its long term interests.84 
 This report of the potentials of development of the reacquired territory represents 
the foundations of the vision leading to the development of Sharm el Sheikh as a 
destination city filled predominately with self-sustaining resort complexes. This vision 
sought to capitalize on the emerging demand for beach tourism from European markets 
and sought to competitively position itself against other destinations offering sun and 
sand such as the Canary Islands, the Caribbean, the Seychelles, Thailand, Malaysia and 
Bali. One competitive advantage noted by this report was the comparative savings in 
airfare for potential travelers originating in Europe.85 Early conceptualizing of the South 
Sinai as a beach destination catering predominantly to the European market influenced 
the development of Sharm el Sheikh and promoted a rapid development to meet the 
demand in a timely manner. 
 
84 Ibid, 4-41 
85 Ibid, 4-37 
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 The development of the South Sinai had to be coordinated between the public and 
the private sectors for an effective and rapid expansion of tourist facilities. Consultants on 
the projected tourist market recommended the building of 50 international-class hotels 
with about 5,600 rooms by the year 2000.86 This expansion required an active tourism 
planning and marketing program to plan the facilities by reserving the best locations 
along the coast, to develop the tourism spaces, and to maintain these spaces to cater to the 
potential requirements of the tourism industry. This organization required coordination 
between government institutions such as the Ministry of Development, its sub-ministry 
the Sinai Development Authority and private enterprises, which at the time of this report 
in 1983, had not emerged to handle large scale development. The Sinai Development 
Authority was created in 1974, and by the time of the consultation conducted by USAID, 
it had the largest budget of any of the Ministry of Development’s implementing 
agencies.87   Consultants from USAID asserted that private enterprises needed to be 
organized from outside the Sinai utilizing financial assistance, partnership agreements 
and active support from the government in order to undertake largescale development of 
the peninsula.88 During the time of this study, the government of Egypt was using public 
enterprise units to manage economic and social development. This model was being 
implemented in the Sinai as a very successful company, the Suez Canal Authority.89 
 In the effort to create a favorable environment for foreign investment, the 
Tourism and Aviation Ministry allowed access to all of the feasibility studies completed 
on tourism potential and stressed its commitment to solve any problems outside investors 
 
86 Sinai Development Study. Managing Sinai’s Development. USAID, MAR 1985. 2-4 
87 Ibid, 3-9 
88 Ibid, 3-1 
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may face, especially in the acquisition of land for building new tourism facilities.90 The 
Ministry sought to build as quickly as possible in the effort to generate 11% increases in 
tourism per year.91 Focus shifted to areas outside of Cairo with efforts concentrated on 
building luxury hotels and attracting the patronage of wealthier tourists.92 
 The National Plan for 1982 – 1987 budgeted 378 million LE for direct tourism 
development throughout Egypt, but the government also expected a significant 
investment from the private sector. Projected investments originating from the private 
sector were to grow from 30 million to 50 million.93 The total planned private investment 
for this period aimed for 140 million LE.94  The South Sinai was of particular interest for 
this overall tourism development strategy, which sought to raise the number of hotel 
rooms from 450 during 1982 to 850 at the end of 1987.95 Furthermore, the strategy for 
growth until the year 2000 sought to capture .6 – 1.7 million visitor days during 1990 and 
1 – 3.7 million visitor days in the year 2000. While the government sought to double the 
hotel rooms in the area by 1987, by 1990 they aimed to have between 1120 – 3480 hotel 
rooms. Even more ambitiously, by the year 2000, there should be 2000 – 7420 hotel 
rooms available in the South Sinai.96 
 With the return of the Sinai to Egypt, the potential for development of the 
territory was recognized by Egyptian officials and international consultants. Tourism 
particularly in the South Sinai was identified as a very important feature of development, 
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which if effectively planned could generate many additional tourists nights within the 
country. Sun and sand tourism catering to European mass package tourism was identified 
as a growing market for which the South Sinai could pose an advantage over competing 
destinations in lower travel costs and closer proximity to Europe. The initial planning for 
tourism development sought to capture part of this market by planning resorts around the 
desires of the European tourist.  
 
2.2  Fordist Momentum 
 
  Revitalized focus on tourism nationwide and the newly emerging plan for 
development in the Sinai sparked beneficial changes in policy for the territory.97 In 1985, 
the Egyptian government began selling land to local investors for tourism development, 
this land sold for $6 – 12 dollars per square meter.98 The government also placed 
stringent conditions on the land: investors must establish the seriousness of their plan 
along with a deposit of 20% of the lands worth in the effort to promote fast development 
and to prevent investors from waiting for price increases on the land.99 Airline rules were 
also liberalized, meaning charter services were now allowed to bypass Cairo and fly 
directly to resort locations.100 The new tourism Minister also chose to further 
privatization of state run hotels which were running poorly. More international firms 
were allowed to manage and operate these hotels through 25 year contracts providing 
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unprecedented autonomy for these companies.101 Infrastructure in support of tourism 
developments outside Cairo received a pledge of $600 million in loans from the World 
Bank, neighboring Arab states, and the Kuwait-based Arab Fund for Social and 
Economic Development.102 Increased private investment in the sector, especially in resort 
tourism, stemmed from policy changes nationally and plans for increased infrastructure 
supporting tourism outside Cairo.103 
 The late 1980s witnessed an increase in tourism developments in beachside 
locations, including a slow beginning to building in Sharm El Sheikh. Developments in 
Hurghada dominated this period, highlighting some potential struggles for investing in 
the South Sinai. The new facilities in Hurghada were planned haphazardly, facing 
problems in logistics in terms of water sewage and power, ultimately falling short of 
international standards.104 These challenges posed a warning for increased investments in 
the Sinai, causing investors to create provisions for proper standards, infrastructure 
services, and the maintenance of the eco-system of the Red Sea. Simultaneously, 
although slowly, international firms began building hotels using foreign companies to 
construct and supply the tourist facilities within Sharm el Sheikh. This included a large 
complex at Tiger Bay in 1987 (built by Badr Investment Company and a firm in 
Singapore), and a tourist village backed by Abu Dhabi Tourism Investment Company.105 
 The tension between structural adjustments and the deliberately piecemeal 
approach taken by the Mubarak government laid a foundation for the planned 
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privatization taking place in the early to mid-1990s. In 1991, Citibank and the UK’s 
Coopers and Lybrand conducted a study about the privatization of tourism facilities 
which was financed by the World Bank’s contribution to the infrastructure fund set up in 
support of tourism.106 Among the first public companies to be opened to private capital 
was the Misr Hotels Company and several assets of the holding company Egyptian 
General Company for Tourism and Hotels.107 Part of the sale of the Misr Hotels 
Company’s shares included its investment in the Sinai Company for Hotels and Sub-
Aqua clubs, which owned several of the hotels in Sharm el Sheikh at that time.108 In 
1993, the Misr Company for Touristic Villages, owner of the Fayruz Hilton in Sharm el 
Sheikh, was privatized.   
 The mid-1990s there was an increase in the development Sharm el Sheikh. 
Tourist sector assets were being privatized nationally, including the South Sinai’s 
facilities. This created a new environment encouraging investment and inspired domestic 
and foreign companies to cooperate in largescale joint ventures within the city. Making 
the area even more attractive, the South Sinai had been immune to the tourism declines 
nationwide due to terrorist attacks. In 1994, the three five star hotels in the area were 
operating at 100% occupancy.109 Shaikh Coast, an Italian company which owned a 75% 
stake in a national company controlling 340,000 meters of land in Sharm el Sheikh, 
began work on a massive five star resort complex offering 300 beds, 150 apartments and 
60 villas.110 Raja Travel and Hotels, a domestic company, sought to build a $30 million 
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dollar hotel in 1994. Two additional luxury hotels, Marriot and Inter-Continental, opened 
their doors in 1995.111  
 The national declines in tourism due to terrorist attacks in the early 1990s were 
not replicated in the burgeoning tourism spaces in the South Sinai. After a short period of 
terrorist activity decline and subsequent feeling of security produced by returning 
tourists, the Luxor Massacre in 1997 reinforced the need for diversification of the tourism 
sector. This surprising terrorist attack cost the Egyptian economy $205 in tourism 
revenue and significantly decreased monthly tourism arrivals for the six month period 
following the massacre. This act of violence and the downturn within the tourism 
industry created an increased sense of urgency in the building of alternative tourism 
spaces in the South Sinai. The regime regarded the new resorts as a safeguard to the 
fragile national industry and, to economic elites, the new developments seemed to be safe 
investments as occupancy rates in hotels were significantly higher than national average. 
The loss in tourism coincides with an exponential increase in building new hotels in the 
Sinai, which experienced a growth rate of over 300% over the next decade.112 
 The late 1990s showed an exponential growth in hotels in Sharm el Sheikh, 
among the new developments were huge luxury hotels. In 1996, 12 hotels were located in 
the Naama Bay area mostly owned by private Egyptian interests.113 Hyatt International 
undertook a contract to manage a new hotel developed domestically in the Naama Bay 
area to be opened in 1997.114 The Moevenpick was set to expand its facilities through $20 
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million dollars of bonds for new villas and a golf course.115 Saudi backed Nesco Egypt 
for Tourism Developments sought to construct a $15 million dollar four star hotel in 1995 
and a $60 million Four Seasons resort began construction in 1997, backed by Prince 
Alwaleed Bin Tawal Bin Abdulaziz and a local contractor.116 At the beginning of 1998, 
Arab Contractors (Osman Ahmed Osman & Company) signed a contract to build the $8 
million dollar Shalalat Hilton for the Arab International Hotels Company.117  The Arab 
Contractors were also commissioned to build the first stage of a five star resort at Nabaq 
Bay for Oriental Resorts Company, in a contract valued at $20 million.118 The Nabaq Bay 
resort was part of a larger tourism complex, which this 300 room and 60 chalet hotel 
marked the beginning of the development. This complex was commissioned by the 
Charming Sharm Company, a venture owned by 28 local business groups set to build 
hotels within the complex.119  
 Unlike the hasty and unplanned development in Hurghada, which left the area 
with major infrastructural challenges, fractured planning in between resorts, and 
ecological threats, the planning in Sharm el Sheikh was an attempt to avoid the same 
mistakes. In the Naama Bay area, a boardwalk connects the major luxury hotels and 
offers a sense of community, although manufactured.120 Construction on new facilities 
was controlled by building permits limiting how close new developments could be to the 
sea and limiting building to two stories.121  Several resorts also attempted to avoid 
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infrastructural problems by building their own desalination, power, and sewage systems. 
The land within the Sharm el Sheikh coast had been set aside for tourism development, 
sold to Egyptian private investors, and then allowed to be developed rapidly and 
individually by these private interests. Projects had to be approved by local authorities, 
but were largely uncontrolled in what kind of facilities were built on private land. Sharm 
el Sheikh was able to avoid many of the mistakes made by developers in Hurghada, 
however the rapid and individualized nature of building created a problem of oversupply 
in the market. 
 The early study conducted by USAID consultants, which looked at a possible 
comprehensive development strategy for the entire Sinai Peninsula, promoted the 
importance of capturing mass tourism emanating from the European market. Another 
study conducted in the early 2000’s allows an examination of the government’s response 
to the early recommendations of USAID. USAID stressed the potential for rapid growth 
and expansive tourism for sun and sand, with the development of the South Sinai 
reflecting an adherence to this development strategy.  
 The projections of the tourism capacities of the South Sinai by the USAID 
consultants made in 1983 were surpassed by the year 2000, the actual capacity more than 
doubled the projected 2000 – 7480 hotel rooms. The rapid development of the area took 
place between 1996 and 2003, coinciding with the crisis in the national industry posed by 
continuing terrorist violence.  South Sinai tourism accommodations grew from 88 total 
tourist establishments with 6979 rooms in 1996 to 221 establishments and 35782 rooms 
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by the year 2003.122 This expansion averages 27% increases in capacities year over year, 
with some years showing a growth of around 40%. The average growth in South Sinai 
hotel rooms between 1996 and 2003 was especially high for four and five star 
accommodations: five star hotels saw an average of 44.6% growth and four star rooms 
grew by 32.7%.  This growth in capacities within the South Sinai was heavily 
concentrated in Sharm el Sheikh which held 73% of available accommodations, 88% of 
the five star hotels in the South Sinai.123 The particular emphasis on the highest end 
establishments reflects the types of tourists visiting the area, the priorities of developers, 
and the projected increase in affluent tourism.  
 Resorts and tourist villages dominated the hotel landscape of the South Sinai, and 
because they were a highly profitable venture, remained an active area for private 
investment. Investors sought to build as quickly as possible because the construction 
costs for hotels often paid for themselves within a few years.124 These establishments 
were often 4 to 5 star establishments, in the effort to capture the European market, and 
strategically attempted to keep guests within the resort by catering to most of their needs. 
These resorts also often had their own source of power generation and their own 
desalination plants, which aided in efficient functioning of individual resorts and 
curtailing ecological threats to the environment. Although the development of Sharm el 
Sheikh attempted to create a sense of an integrated city, the individualized resort enclaves 
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not only supported themselves but retained a large percentage of profits due to the lack of 
incentive for the resort goer to venture outside.  
 The study conducted in 2003 of the history of development of the South Sinai 
commissioned by the Egyptian Environmental Affairs Agency noted the rapid growth of 
tourism capacities in the area and discussed potential future issues in development of this 
sector. It is noted that at the time of the report, in less than 20 years, the South Sinai 
represented more than 20% of the overall tourism capacity of Egypt and generated 
around 25% of tourism’s contribution to the gross domestic product. Consultants writing 
in 2003 projected that this region could be responsible for 40% of Egyptian tourism by 
2013.125 This report expects that the success in the South Sinai will continue and grow, 
however, there were a few issues outlined to address to ensure the continued success.  
 The issues with the growth of the tourism capacities in the South Sinai were 
identified as: threats posed by outside regional and world events, environmental 
destruction, undiversified tourist economy, and internal competition.126 While overall 
tourism in Egypt is very sensitive to world and regional events, this study noted that 
tourism to Sharm el Sheikh seemed to be less affected by outside events. However, many 
tourist establishments could fail if long term crisis happens to impact tourism to the area. 
Consultants noted the possibility for the deterioration of the environment, specifically to 
the coral reef systems and marine life, both of which are highly unique draws to the Sinai. 
At the time of this study, there was an observed beginning of deterioration due to 
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pollution, unregulated fishing, and tourism activities. This was and remains a serious 
issue for the South Sinai, as the period of 1987 – 1996 sustained a 20 – 30% decrease in 
live coral cover.127 
 The tourism market within the area was noted at this time as highly undiversified 
and susceptible to price cuts due to internal competition. The undiversified nature of 
tourism occurred because the overwhelming majority of tourists visiting the area seek 
resort activities. This was described as problematic for consultants in 2003 due to the 
potential inability of the tourist industry to sustain fluctuations in consumer demand.128 
Consultants recommended a diversification through religious sites, eco-tourism, and 
desert treks. Marketing for the area should not only attempt to offer these additional 
activities to the resort and sea tourist, but also attempt to attract visitors specifically for 
these other attractions in the South Sinai. It is noted that Sharm el Sheikh, in this period, 
was already expanding its offerings through hosting national and international 
conferences.129 An additional challenge requiring diversification was the amount of high 
end establishments within Sharm el Sheikh and the broader South Sinai. As discussed 
above, high end tourist accommodations witnessed disproportional growth between 1996 
and 2003. One final note on the potential dangers within the tourism market was the 
tendency of competitors to significantly undercut each other in pricing, which both 
threatened the economic viability of establishments and had the potential to halt further 
property investments.130 
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 The consultation in 2003 speaks to the projections offered by the Sinai 
Development plan drafted by international consultants in 1983. The earlier development 
plan emphasized the capacity for success within a tourist industry focused on the growing 
market of European guests seeking sun and sand vacations. In line with this early vision, 
the South Sinai almost exclusively focused on resort developments catering to this 
market. The high end resort developments grew substantially year after year, far 
surpassing the early projected numbers of accommodations in the area. While consultants 
examining South Sinai development warned of the potential dangers of an undiversified 
tourism market in the region, their assessment was optimistic about the continued growth 
and success of resort tourism in the South Sinai. The 1990s was a period of exponential 
growth for the tourism capacities of the South Sinai. Tourism facilities outgrew early 
projections, as a result of government policies encouraging rapid growth and creating an 
attractive environment for private investment. For the Mubarak Regime, the rapid 
development of this new resort presented an opportunity to stabilize the national tourist 
sector when challenged by terrorism. Although problems began to emerge from this rapid 
development, the regime continued to promote further development of tourism facilities 
in the resort.   
 
2.3  Structuralism on the Resort 
 
 Since the 1980s beach tourism in Egypt attracted the majority of new and repeat 
visitors to the county. Beach tourism represented 82% of arrivals and about 90% of 
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private investment in the tourism industry by the year 2012.131 There was a conscious 
decision by the central government to develop the South Sinai to cater to the growing 
industry of mass beach tourism. The central government recognized several fiscal 
benefits nationally through the venture into sun and sand tourism, such as gaining foreign 
currency, expanding employment opportunities and generating revenues which offset 
budget deficits. The economic importance of this diversification of the tourism sector was 
emphasized with the instability created by terrorism in the 1990s. The regime was 
emboldened by the Luxor Massacre to rapidly develop tourism capacities removed from 
terrorist activity in mainland Egypt. The government implemented liberalization policies 
alongside privatization to encourage private investment in the new resort areas of the 
South Sinai.  
 Under Sadat in the 1970s, the overall management of the tourism sector was 
transferred Ministry of Tourism, allowing the ministry the ability to regulate the sector.132  
The ministry gained the power to set standards and pricing for hotels. Shortly after, the 
ministry gained the exclusive ability to designate territory for tourism development and 
expansion.133 Foreign investment was incentivized in the early 1970s through the new 
ability to build joint ventures with domestic partners, tax exemptions of 15 years and a 
new guarantee of property rights for real-estate holdings and capital investments.134  
Foreign investors were given the ability to repatriate profits overseas and to withdraw 
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their investment without obstacles.135 Further liberalization of the tourism sector occurred 
in the 1980s. Among these opening polices was the canceling of import restrictions on 
products related to the tourism sector, reducing the prices of land along the Red Sea to 
encourage private investment, approving foreign management of public hotels, and the 
expansion of Egypt Air’s operations to underserviced destinations.136 This incremental 
opening of the sector started before major investment in the Sinai, but demonstrated the 
willingness of the government to encourage foreign involvement, support foreign and 
domestic private investment, and laid the foundations for future development of the Sinai. 
 The 1990s presented a period of fluctuation in tourism, which the Sinai was 
largely immune. This stability in the market along with the potential for large return on 
new investments peaked investor interest in the territory. The Ministry of Tourism 
focused on building infrastructural capabilities to support expanding areas such as the 
South Sinai Coast. The creation of the Tourism Development Authority (TDA) 
centralized fragmented planning and created a comprehensive plan for tourism 
development.137 Following the creation of this authority, private investment grew rapidly 
in the South Sinai.  
 The TDA created the framework controlling development in the South Sinai. It 
quickly sold remote coastal land to private domestic investors, who reaped substantial 
benefits in these sales. This land was valueless public land, turned private assets through 
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sales and then became exponentially valuable through their exclusive designation as 
tourism development areas.138 Land sold and then deemed tourism development areas 
exceeded its original price in some cases by almost 10000% after signing contracts with 
the TDA. This artificial inflation in land prices exemplifies regime patronage to elites 
willing to invest in the early stages of development in the Sinai. Early investors in the 
South Sinai gained huge profits over night, and investments in developing the land not 
only recouped their investments extremely quickly, but continued to turn huge profits 
year after year. The building of tourism complexes often paid for themselves within two 
years and only needed an occupancy rate of 30% to remain open.139 The design and 
construction of these large resorts in Sharm el Sheikh was handled by both foreign and 
domestic companies. The ownership of the complexes often remained with Egyptian 
investors due to the legal framework in the Sinai requiring at least 51% Egyptian 
ownership. The management of these resorts were contracted out to international 
hoteliers, who usually received 2% turnover and 10% of the profits.140 The potential for 
high return on investment, coupled with the South Sinai’s perceived immunity from 
tourism fluctuations experienced by the rest of the country, created extremely favorable 
conditions for private investors in the late 1990s. 
 The profitable private investor environment, the government’s emphasis on rapid 
expansion, and the perception of exponentially growing demand from European mass 
beach tourism quickly produced conditions of over-supply. While liberalization and legal 
reforms favoring privatization have been profitable for the Egyptian elite investors, the 
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sector lacked specified planning and coordination which has led to several negative and 
undesirable economic, social, environmental and cultural impacts. Lack of planning 
damaged the environment, created dissatisfaction from local communities, and 
oversupply in the sector led to reduction in prices and devaluation of investments.  
 The unique aspect of Sharm el Sheikh is the large and diverse coral reefs, which 
separates the location from other sun and sand destinations. This coastline houses 200 
species of corals exclusive to Egypt.141 There are a large number of species of fish and 
turtles living in the coast, which are also unique to the ecosystem. Several activities 
related to tourism affect the lifespan of this special feature of the South Sinai. Tourism 
facilities (hotels, marinas, golf courses and infrastructure), generation of waste, and 
tourist activities threaten to deteriorate the environment. Facilities built very close to the 
sea impact the reefs and species of aquatic life, while golf courses and marinas change 
the shoreline, destroy reefs and cause sedimentation. Resorts in Sharm el Sheikh often 
include their own marinas and golf courses to try to remain competitive.142 Tourism 
activities also impact the reefs as tourists may intentionally damage them for souvenirs 
and throw waste into the sea.143 The overemphasis on quantity of tourism rather than 
quality contributes to the deteriorating environment around the city and threatens future 
tourism. While Egypt has a sufficient number of environment related institutions and 
regulations, the institutions do not function effectively and fail in their ability to 
effectively implement these policies.144 This inability to properly enforce environmental 
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regulations has been observed by international consultants seeking to evaluate the 
environmental impacts of rapid tourism development in the South Sinai.145 
 The rapid expansion of tourism accommodations in the area and the high price 
points for a majority of the hotels has led to an oversupply of luxury resorts. This poses a 
new challenge to tourism in the area because of the elastic demand for the kind of holiday 
offered in Sharm el Sheikh. Sun and sand tourism is homogeneous in the sense that the 
destinations are easily substitutable.146 Assessments of the tourism sector warns of the 
danger in this fickle form of tourism in that it is dangerously price-sensitive and creates 
cut throat competition to offer the lowest prices in the market among resorts.147 The 
intense competition keeping prices low attracts budget holiday makers further 
deteriorating the social class of visiting tourists. The Red Sea has begun to be perceived 
as a low-price and low quality destination. The types of tourists historically which visited 
Sharm el Sheikh were the most budget constrained overall and consumed the least 
amount of domestic services. Russian tourists mainly purchase all-inclusive packages 
which allowed very small profits for domestic profits.148 These all-inclusive packages 
drive down prices and allow very little profits for business and services outside the resort. 
 Several problems had emerged within Sharm el Sheikh due to government 
encouragement of rapid growth, a lack of oversight for spatial planning and the rush to 
develop the space by economic elites. International consultants evaluating structural 
problems in Sharm el Sheikh have identified an increase in competition both within the 
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resort and against competing destinations, a decline in price points and reputation and the 
beginning of ecological decline. These emerging vulnerabilities to decline can be used to 
analyze the resort’s similarities with other global south resorts and apply the model of the 
Tourism Area Life Cycle.  
 
2.4  Stagnation in the Life Cycle of Sharm el Sheikh 
 
 This section argues that following the rapid development of Sharm el Sheikh, the 
resort was in a critical stage of development according to the model of the Tourism Area 
Life Cycle. Because of this critical stage, the resort was especially vulnerable to decline. 
Sharm el Sheikh and the wider South Sinai experienced rapid development according to 
perceived demand coming from the European market. This momentum of development is 
seen in other tourism destinations, which experience a period of decline following the 
rapid development phase. This connection between development and decline has been 
theorized by the work of Butler in his Tourist Area Life which presents a linear evolution 
of a space based on the product cycle concept.149 The figure below illustrates the 
theorized linear development of tourist areas.  
 
149 Butler, Richard. ‘The Concept of the Tourist Area Life Cycle of Evolution: Implications for 
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  Figure 1: The Tourist Area Life Cycle of Evolution  (Butler, 1980) 
 
 This process begins with a small number of visitors as the space is restricted by 
access and lack of awareness, followed by growing facilities and awareness. Popularity 
spreads through the introduction of marketing and the quick expansion of facilities. The 
development stage is the point where local businesses are replaced by international 
business, the landscape of the area changes to suit tourism, and the type of tourists 
visiting changing from individual adventure based to institutionalized, seeking 
homogeneous experiences.150 Following the development stage, periods of consolidation 
and stagnation occur characterized by major international franchises represented in the 
area, well defined tourism business districts, capacity levels being exceeded, and a 
decline in image from fashionable to well-known and outdated. Stagnation also manifests 
in imported and artificial facilities, surplus in accommodation, and a heavy reliance on 
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repeat visitation. The type of visitor also moves from individual to mass based tourism.151 
The stagnation of the destination occurs when visitor numbers drop as the capacity of the 
place begins to decline. Butler identified reasons for the decrease in capacity as 
environmental factors, logistic factors, and societal factors, such as crowding and 
resentment towards tourists visiting the area.152 For Butler, the period of stagnation is 
critical, as it can lead either to decline, where the destination can no longer compete with 
other attractions, or renewal, through which a destination must reorient its tourism aims 
and attractions.  
 Putra and Hitchcock apply the Tourism Area Life Cycle to the experience of Bali 
following the bombings of 2012. These bombings produced the worst downturn faced by 
Bali tourism; while the government implemented several national and local initiatives to 
revive the tourism industry, this explanation alone cannot account for the resurgence in 
tourism to the destination.153 Utilizing the Tourism Area Life Cycle, Putra and Hitchcock 
assert that the strong growth in tourism following the stabilization of the security 
situation on the island can be accounted for the underlying development phase of the 
area. Bali had not yet reached the point of consolidation within Butler’s model, which 
means the development continued and led to a strong recovery and growth.154 This study 
utilizes Butler’s model to explain the recovery of tourism in Bali, while for the case 
examined in our project, the model can explain the opposite effect.  
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 If we apply the Tourism Area Life Cycle to the case of Sharm el Sheikh, there are 
several features which align with the periods of consolidation and stagnation described by 
Butler. Before the crash, which ushered in the extreme decline in tourism, many of the 
successful hotels in the city were franchises of large hotel chains. These hotels were 
experiencing fierce competition amongst themselves to secure business through the 
predominantly mass tourism based guests coming into the city. Mass beach tourism was 
becoming responsible for the majority of visitors, which is described in Butler’s model as 
part of the stagnation phase of development. The city itself was largely built to cater 
towards tourism activities, had developed inauthentic facilities for hosting tourists and the 
space had excluded the Bedouin locals once living on the coast. The exclusion of local 
populations will be covered within the next chapter, although it is noted here that this is 
part of the classification of stagnation. With these features of stagnation, the city had 
reached its capacity for accommodations through an oversupply. This oversupply is 
evident in the trends in changing number of hotels before the crash. In 2003, there were 
221 hotels in the South Sinai, which fell to 187 by 2006 and rose briefly to 196 in 2009. 
Since 2009, hotel numbers have declined: 181 in 2010, 175 in 2012, 158 in 2014, and 111 
in 2015.155 The last year that CAPMAS counted hotels in the South Sinai was the 2015 
figure at 111. This was a significant decline from 221 twelve years earlier. This hotel loss 
could be partially due to the decline in tourism since 2011, but this trend had begun 8 
years prior. The falling hotel numbers and the reliance on tourists coming from mass 
tourism indicate that Sharm el Sheikh had entered the stagnation phase of Butler’s model, 
implying that any external shock to tourism would make recovery very difficult without a 
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substantive reorientation in the attractions within the region and the type of tourist 
coming to the destination.  
  Sharm el Sheikh sped through the linear development modeled by the Tourism 
Area Life Cycle because of government policies encouraging rapid development. 
Although the quick development of this resort held many economic benefits for the 
regime and elites, the two and a half decades of development for the mass tourism market 
has brought Sharm el Sheikh to a critical point, according to Butler’s model. This critical 
point could lead to rejuvenation or decline, based on policy choices, but due to political 
violence and insecurity, the resort is experiencing a decline. The race towards stagnation 
was partially due to the marketing towards mass beach tourism, a key feature of 
stagnation within the Tourism Area Life Cycle model. The next section will discuss 
theoretical implications of the focus on mass beach tourism and will compare the 
experience of Sharm el Sheikh to other destinations in the global south.  
 
2.5  Choosing Dependency and Problems with the Mass Tourism Model 
 
 Capturing the mass tourism market emerging from Europe was the expressed goal 
of the regime in the development of Sharm el Sheikh. Previous sections have discussed 
the motivations for this model of development and the last section framed this goal as one 
component of the critical point in resort development. This section will expand on the 
vulnerability of Sharm el Sheikh in this critical moment by applying dependency theory 
and comparing the experience of Sharm el Sheikh to other global south resort enclaves.  
69 
 
 Tourism literature utilizing the dependency discourse aids in our understanding of 
the development of Sharm el Sheikh, but the case study poses important deviations to this 
view of global south tourism. Dependency theorists examining global south tourism see 
the exploitation and consumption of the destination through profit leakages, foreign 
management and ownership of tourist facilities, and the conceptualization and 
development of the space as homogeneous and interchangeable. The role of government 
policies creates a major distinction in the case study of Sharm el Sheikh. The next 
subsection, ‘Deviations from the Dependency Model’, expands on the ways Sharm el 
Sheikh deviates from the standard resort characterized by dependency. Sharm el Sheikh 
proves divergent in several ways: demonstrated agency in planning by the central 
government, large profit margins for local elites, and the maintenance of profits of large 
hotels due to structural frameworks of management contracts.   Following the discussion 
of these differences, ‘Similarities with the Dependency Model’ examines how Sharm el 
Sheikh aligns with dependency theory related critiques of destinations in the global south. 
The similarities of the case study with other global south destinations characterized by 
dependency are many: designed as resort enclave, Fordism created demand and 
influenced growth, homogenization of the destination, ecological damage, little revenue 
for local small business, lack of control over demand, and loss of control when external 
shocks threaten the numbers of tourists. 
 
 2.5.1  Deviations from the Dependency Model  
 
 One major critique of the tenants of dependency is the over emphasis on the 
external factors in the development of internal tourism industries. While the desires and 
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needs of the west drove the nature and style of development in the wider South Sinai, we 
cannot ignore the collective agency in planning for this development. It is important to 
note that when the government sought a plan of development for the area, they 
specifically marked Sharm el Sheikh as having a unique ability to tap into the mass 
package tourism coming out of Europe, which was a fast growing portion of the 
international tourism industry. In this vein, Sharm el Sheikh capitalized on its sand and 
sea features and the government attempted to grow the accommodations of the area very 
quickly to capture a share of the demand. The initial planning strategy and subsequent 
studies warned the government about the over reliance on the sun/sea features of the area, 
recommending a diversification of the offerings of the territory. The government 
miscalculated continued demand for more luxury all-inclusive resorts at the same price 
points, and expressed its agency in encouraging rapid development of the area to suit the 
needs of projected future tourism from the European middle class.  
 Unlike other destinations in the global south, Sharm el Sheikh expanded using 
different contractual policies which impacted control over profits. The Sinai’s land was 
sold to domestic business elites, and was designated as tourism development sites which 
exponentially grew the value of the land. This land was either developed by initial 
investors or was sold to other domestic owners who could develop the sites. The 
government policies for the Sinai stipulate that ownership must be at least 51% Egyptian. 
This creates conditions where the land and constructed resorts remain in control of elites, 
but are contracted out to international operators. The provisions of these contracts favor 
domestic investors as the average contract allows for the operators to gain 2% turnover 
and 10% of profits. In other cases, ownership or a large amount of the profits on resorts 
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are considered ‘leakages’, or they return to the international operators and permanently 
leave the country. This is a very important distinction in the dependency argument. 
Theorists argue that because destinations lose a significant portion of proceeds through 
these ‘leakages’, the international community exploits the global south destination. This 
is not the case in Sharm el Sheikh as a majority of the profits remain with the business 
elite, but the profits do not benefit the government or the vast majority of the population. 
 This subsection has discussed several key differences between Sharm el Sheikh 
and the typical dependent resort in the global south. These differences stem from 
government decision making, such as the policies related to ownership of resort facilities. 
Government decision making specifically sought to build this resort as an enclave for 
mass tourism, which aligns Sharm el Sheikh with other dependent resorts, despite 
ownership remaining with the domestic elite. The next subsection will outline the 
characteristics which classify Sharm el Sheikh as a dependent resort, despite the major 
difference of government decision making.  
 
 2.5.2  Similarities with the Dependency Model 
 
 Sharm el Sheikh possesses characteristics which are similar to dependent resorts 
in the global south. This resort was designed as a resort enclave, demand and growth has 
been influenced by Fordism, it is homogenous with other destinations, and it has suffered 
ecological damage as a result of tourism activities. Furthermore, there is little revenue for 
small businesses. Control over the resort is limited in fundamental ways: there is a lack of 
control over demand and a loss of control when external shocks threaten the number of 
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tourists. These characteristics will be presented in this subsection, followed by a 
conclusion concerning this lack of power in maintaining demand for mass tourism.  
 The resort enclave model is fundamentally connected to fordist demand and 
design, which manifests in homogenized tourism spaces. The classification of a tourism 
space as a resort enclave is an important component of the argument of this project, and 
Sharm el Sheikh shares many features with this model. The main tenants of dependency 
theory used by scholars looking at tourism in the global south contend that tourist 
enclaves are built for western interests, maintained by western entities, and necessarily 
exploit the host country within the periphery. This theorized structure is the basis for the 
argument of dependency in the reliance on outside demand, outside tour operators and 
hotel operators, and the use (and sometimes destruction) of the destination until more 
preferable destinations gain traction. The combination of these assertions results in the 
conclusion that this system perpetuates chronic underdevelopment in host countries. The 
tourist enclave perfectly illuminates the argument of dependency theorists looking at the 
global south.  
 The tourism enclave is a strategy for development of a territory attempting to 
serve the needs of mass tourism. The tourism enclave provides a closed area created for 
tourists, who often are taken directly to their resort upon arrival.156 Jenkins describes the 
enclave structure as being detached from the host community and one whose purpose is 
not to benefit the local community.157 These created spaces are used entirely by tourists 
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and are built and managed by international corporations. This kind of resort discourages 
the movement of the foreign tourist outside of the walls of the enclave area. Separation 
between the tourist and the local population occurs, which embodies a form of neo-
colonialization.158 The development of tourism enclaves occurs when circumstances are 
controlled by multinational corporations or other external actors and are often a 
manifestation of power inequalities.159 This understanding of enclave tourism fits the 
structure of Sharm el Sheikh, although some areas were designed to generate a sense of 
community. The all-inclusive resorts deter the need to move beyond the walls and 
assessments of the tourism industry there have found that many tourists never leave the 
compound. These homogenized resorts are fabricated for the needs of the tourist and are 
divorced from the surrounding community. The case of Sharm el Sheikh deviates from 
the standard dependency model of profit leakages from destination countries to 
multinational corporations. The control of multinational corporations in Sharm el Sheikh 
is limited by policies restricting foreign ownership. However, the majority of the profits 
from the resort remain with the domestic elite which are not connected to the population 
in the Sinai, a point which will be heavily expanded upon in the following chapter. 
 The previous paragraphs have classified Sharm el Sheikh as a resort enclave and 
expanded upon the ways in which this model fits dependency theory based critiques of 
mass tourism. The next major point where Sharm el Sheikh complies with the 
dependency model of tourism development is the design and development ultimately 
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stemming from Fordism. This economic system is characterized by mass production and 
mass consumption, which can be expressed through mass tourism. Mowforth and Munt 
view mass tourism as an expression of cultural dependency. Locations seeking to attract 
the mass tourist market result in creating a homogenized package, divorced from the 
surrounding economic, cultural and physical environment. For these researchers, this 
older form of tourism is characterized by Fordism and is designed in the west specifically 
for western interests.160 Waleed Hazbun was the first to apply Fordism to resort 
development in the Mediterranean through his in depth look at the Tunisian tourism 
industry.161 This work by Hazbun illuminates several important similarities in the 
creation of the tourism space for the mass package tourist.  
 Hazbun asserts the Tunisian beach economy was directly influenced by the 
demand of industrialized Europe’s growing middle class and it supplied a standardized 
product which was place substitutable.162 For Hazbun, Fordism characterized both the 
growing demand for mass beach tourism, through growing consumerism and its ability to 
sustain expanding destinations in the Mediterranean, and the incorporation of Tunisia into 
this supply-demand structure.163 Like other destinations in the region, the early growth of 
the Tunisian beach industry was marked by standardization, reliance on strategies of 
international hotel chains, little control over the demand, and the desire to build supply 
with little capital to make sure their product remained competitive.164 The standardization 
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of the product created highly interchangeable destinations which eventually had to fight 
for the business of international tour companies who sought the cheapest rates. Although 
the development of Sharm el Sheikh occurred over two decades after the Tunisian model, 
there are important similarities between the cases. The initial strategies of both 
governments was to create as much supply as possible according to the projected 
demands and desires of the European middle class. In Egypt, private investment in this 
budding area of the tourist sector was highly attractive because of policy changes, 
perceived growth in demand, and the probability of gaining huge profits. The tourist 
industry in Tunisia in the early 1970s was characterized by highly homogenized hotels 
offering all-inclusive amenities which resulted in the majority of bookings coming 
through tour operators outside of the country, with the tourist experience being limited to 
the confines of the resort.165 Sharm el Sheikh faced the same problem, a majority of the 
tourism into the city was confined to the five star resorts and was dominated by package 
tourism from Russia, Eastern Europe and Great Britain. When Tunisia faced its initial 
crisis in occupancy and arrivals, combined with the pressure to drop rates to stay 
competitive, the government responded with a tighter control of the industry. Specifically 
the government continued to grow the hotels and amenities but instituted price ceilings 
resulting in the continued building of accommodations at lower price points. The 
government in Egypt has yet to tighten control over the industry in Sharm el Sheikh. The 
accommodations in the city have grown very quickly, are unregulated in terms of price 
range, and heavily rely on the demand from mass package tourism. Furthermore, as the 
last major study over South Sinai tourism mentions, the many government bodies 
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involved in tourism in the region contribute to the lack of oversight in development and 
the lack of central planning necessary to gain control in the way the Tunisian government 
did in the in the late 1970s. 
 The model of the resort enclave fits the case of Sharm el Sheikh, and the resort 
matches several key characteristics of fordist development in tourism as advanced by the 
work of Hazbun. One major characteristic is the homogenization of the tourist space. 
This feature is very important to our case, as it makes the resort highly substitutable 
which contributes to destination substitution for a variety of reasons. . For Mowforth and 
Munt, this homogenization of vacation spaces is a manifestation of cultural globalization, 
created by a standardized form of consumerism.166 Consumers within the mass tourism 
model perpetuate the homogenized nature of beach resorts through their indiscriminate 
consumption based on low prices and a disregard for the local culture of the destination. 
For Hazbun, the homogenized nature of mass tourism beach destinations produces a form 
of deterritorialization, where a complete disregard for specific unique aspects of a 
destination and local culture occurs, which further contributes to the interchangeability of 
the destination.167 Our case study exemplifies the deterritorialization discussed by 
Hazbun and the homogenized nature of the resort enclave. The enclaves of the city are 
built as standard versions of international hotels. They were built to be consumed by 
European holiday makers seeking year round warm water beaches and because of the 
manifestation of that consumer preference, the destination has become interchangeable. 
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This interchangeability generates several problems currently faced by the city: extreme 
competition over pricing in the space, lack of control over pricing due to external tour 
operators seeking the best prices between destinations, and the ability for external shocks 
to impact the amount of tourists visiting the space. 
 Pricing and control over profit are issues faced by these homogenized tourist 
spaces and can be illuminated through the example of Sharm el Sheikh. It is a necessity 
that these spaces remain competitive against international competitors offering similar 
holidays. This drives the pricing very low, and in a space like Sharm el Sheikh, whose 
market was facing oversupply due to unrestrained growth, the need to remain competitive 
was pressing. Analysis in the early 2000s comments upon the fierce competition among 
resorts to book the tourists coming into the city. This drove prices very low and as a 
result threatened private investments and the overall quality of the resort. The perception 
of tourists is altered as a result because the lower prices coupled with a higher number of 
visitors drive away the higher end clientele, who begin see the destination as low quality. 
This creates a cycle which is difficult to recover from as it continually lowers prices as it 
exclusively captures the lower end of holiday makers. Besides the domestic competition 
for resort occupancy, the space must contend with international competition. International 
tour agencies dealing with mass tourism based packages have a significant amount of 
leverage in setting prices for destinations. These companies pursue the cheapest 
destinations to expand their profit margins and to gain the most clients. This dynamic 
impacted Sharm el Sheikh because of its reliance upon these mass tourism packages. A 
significant number of visitors to the city came through these channels, which further 
drives down resort prices. This structure demonstrates the argument that resort enclaves 
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in the global south have a distinct lack of control over the pricing of the destination and 
lose a significant amount of profits because of the extremely low pricing. 
Homogenization of the tourism space contributes to higher competition for the mass 
tourism market. This higher competition creates a race to the bottom, were destinations 
lower prices against internal competitors and against alternate destinations. 
  The final similarity between the present case study and other resort destinations 
in the global south is the threat of ecological damage to the site. This is particularly 
important for Sharm el Sheikh because it boasts a large and diverse coral reef system 
housing unique forms of plant and animal life. This feature of the space, although not the 
main driving factor in tourism, can be used to generate higher numbers of tourists. Mass 
tourism necessarily emphasizes quantity over quality, which stretches the ability for the 
area to sustainably handle this large amount of traffic. The effects of this form of tourism 
is evident in the beginning of the destruction of the reefs through infrastructural problems 
and tourism activities. Other destinations have faced this degradation, and this process is 
described as a part of the life cycle of a destination described by Butler (as discussed in 
the previous section).168 Butler’s model describes the process of the rise and fall of 
destinations, and ecological damage of the space is a main feature of the point of 
stagnation or decline. As the environment is damaged, from exceeding the inherent 
capacity of the site, there is a decline in the quality of visitors and experience which leads 
to less money to rejuvenate the space.169 Ecological damage from mass tourism is a 
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feature shared by many destinations in the global south and this process ultimately 
permanently degrades the tourism space.  
 
 2.5.3  Vulnerabilities in Relying on the Mass Beach Tourist 
 
 The previous subsection outlined the major ways that Sharm el Sheikh’s features 
align with the model of the dependent resort. These were the enclave design, fordist 
development, homogenization of the space and ecological damage. The last major 
similarity between our case and other destinations in the global south lies in the 
inherently unequal power dynamic between countries of origin and the destination. This 
chapter has focused on economic development of the tourism space, the next will cover 
social dynamics in the South Sinai and the final chapter examines political vulnerabilities 
in the created space. The following conclusions regarding power dynamics are limited to 
the economics of development, as the political and security factors will be examined in 
‘Political Instability and Managing Tourism: Creation and Compromise of the New 
Tourism Space’.  
 The Mubarak regime sought to design and develop South Sinai resorts as a means 
of economic stability, although the target market of mass beach tourism held potential 
weaknesses. The resort was designed based on a resort enclave model: based on the needs 
of the European tourist, removed from the surrounding environment and easily 
substitutable with other resorts around the world. Largescale tourism and a lack of 
planning has created environmental damage to the area, which degrades the quality of 
vacations and leads to lowered pricing for the space. Oversupply of tourism facilities has 
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emerged within Sharm el Sheikh, leading to increased competition among hoteliers. The 
lowered pricing to gain business has brought lower income tourists and has negatively 
impacted the reputation of the resort. These economic conditions within Sharm el Sheikh 
reflect the stagnation phase of Butler’s Tourism Area Life Cycle, which is the critical 
point before potential decline. The irony in this development is that government policies 
have created this vulnerability to natural decline, according to Butler’s model. The 
specific targeting of European mass beach tourism has accelerated the potential for 
decline while laying the foundation for another expression of inequality in power 
between Egypt and tourist countries of origin.  
 One feature of the dependency model of tourism area development which 
particularly speaks to the present moment in Sharm el Sheikh is the potential for sharp 
decline of tourism in the case of political instability or the general perception of the area 
being unsafe for travel. The heavy reliance on first world patronage is extremely apparent 
with this example. Global south destinations face heavy decline and potential collapse 
based on the perception of risk by the first worlds’ gaze. When a country is deemed 
unsafe for travel, first world countries circulate this notion and can virtually destroy the 
tourism industry within the destination. This final feature of dependence fits our case 
study of Sharm el Sheikh. When faced with terrorism, the area was no longer a desirable 
place to visit in relation to other, safer and similar locations. The standardization and lack 
of diversification within the industry of the city contributed to the interchangeable nature 
of the destination and its ultimate decline. As Sharm el Sheikh gained most of its income 
and visitors through this form of tourism, it was a devastating blow to the city when mass 
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tourism packages halted. The political and security challenges related to this decline will 
be further expanded upon in the final chapter.  
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3.  EXCLUSION AND ALIENATION OF THE SOUTH SINAI BEDOUIN 
 
 While the Mubarak Regime planned to diversify the national tourism sector 
through the development of the South Sinai, planning for this development ignored the 
Bedouin community located on the peninsula. As development intensified and mainland 
Egyptian investors increased their wealth, the poverty increased in the Bedouin 
community. The progressive impoverishment of the Bedouin was due to the dual forces 
of coercive sedentarization and exclusion from the economic benefits of increased 
tourism.  The Bedouin were effectively excluded from the planning and development 
process of tourism spaces and facilities, which impacted their lifestyle, livelihoods, local 
environment, and ultimately, their identity.  
 The contestation of the Sinai Peninsula ended in 1982, when Egypt’s peace treaty 
with Israel mandated the complete turnover of the space to Egyptian authorities following 
15 years of Israeli occupation. The Camp David Accords mandated that Egypt limit its 
security forces in the territory, which hindered the state’s ability to fully incorporate the 
peninsula.170 Despite this initial security limitation, an economic analysis of the space 
commenced, with the goal of ascertaining opportunities presented by the newly 
reacquired territory. The South Sinai was inhabited by several varied Bedouin tribes, 
which had historical roots to the space for well before the Islamic period, with current 
estimates of the population totaling 40,000 people organized into eight tribes.171 These 
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tribes have varied means of livelihoods, lifestyles and social organizations and have been 
challenged by varied state economic policies. 
 Among the tribes affected by tourism development in the Sinai are the Mzeina, Al 
Tarabin and Jebeliya, who have all had unique economic histories dependent on their 
inhabited territory. Distinctive effects on these communities were produced by the 
different state-led development strategies. The Saint Katherine Monastery and 
surrounding area represent one attempt at the creation of a national protection area, while 
Sharm El Sheikh exemplifies a resort enclave characterized by exclusion. Dahab’s slow 
pace of development has created a reluctant inclusion of Bedouin on the periphery of the 
tourism space, although the state seeks to further marginalize their informal tourism 
activities. The development policies pursued by the government has presented distinctive 
challenges in economic exclusion and growing dependence on tourism within the South 
Sinai Bedouin communities.  
 This chapter examines the economic and social changes within the Bedouin tribes 
inhabiting the South Sinai. It begins with highlighting the relationship of the Bedouin to 
the land and the government policies which formally removed their rights to ownership. 
The next section, ‘Altered Bedouin Livelihoods’ illuminates the economic changes 
resulting from the changed relationship between the Bedouin and their land. The next 
portion looks at the failed attempt of the Egyptian government to incorporate the Bedouin 
in the tourism space surrounding the Saint Katherine Monastery.  This chapter concludes 
with a discussion of the inherent problems of the exclusion of the Bedouin from 
participating in the newly created tourism space and sets up the final chapter on the 
deteriorating security situation in the Sinai Peninsula.  
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3.1  Divorced from the Local Environment 
 
 The central dominating force for Bedouin life is the land. With their highly 
specific knowledge of flora and fauna, seasonal weather patterns and the delicate balance 
of resources in the territory, the Bedouin lifestyle was built upon the use and maintenance 
of this space. While attempting to avoid essentializing or romanticizing the community, it 
is imperative to understand the communities’ conceptualization of land use and 
ownership.  
 The relationship between the Bedouin and the land has been historically 
dominated by customary law. Inter-tribal agreements segmented the land between 
‘developed’ and common property. Land used for grazing and the coastline were 
considered public or common land, as they were indispensable to the tribes because of 
pastoral activities.172 Tribes along the coast did not cultivate the land, which maintained 
the space for community use, people were allowed to move through spaces inhabited by 
other tribes.173 The Mzeina tribe historically lived on the coast between Sharm El Sheikh 
and the city of Dahab, however other tribes were allowed access to the sea.174 
Ethnographic studies of the Bedu tribes show a cultural emphasis on material equality, 
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which has been produced by the impermanence of wealth gained through pastoralism and 
a common use of land and resources.175 
 Under occupation, the Israeli Nature Preserves Authority proclaimed that 98% of 
the South Sinai coast was a protected land preserve.176 This protection had a dual effect: 
it limited physical development of the land by the authorities and controlled the building 
on the land by local Bedouin. The Israeli government constructed one major roadway 
along the coastline in 1972, and two semi-cooperative farms with adjoining small holiday 
villages.177 The tourism developments built by the Israeli occupiers were limited to a 
township at Sharm el Sheikh, a low-scale resort area near the township and one large 
luxury hotel at Taba.178 The mandate of protection curbed largescale physical changes to 
the land, however this decree effectively hampered local Bedouin construction. During 
this time, no Bedouin was allowed to undertake new construction of buildings other than 
wooden shacks despite their traditional use of seasonal homes on the coast which were 
better constructed.179 This limitation on building by the Bedouin would later obstruct 
their claims to ownership of the land when Israel turned control of the space over to 
Egyptian Authorities. 
 According to the traditions of the Mzeina tribe, there were three main ways a 
family could stake their claim to a piece of land. The planting of fruit trees was one major 
signifier of land claim. Second, the building of a permanent dwelling is one mark of 
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development, which separates itself from the construction of palm huts which through 
customary law could be constructed on any piece of land whether claimed or 
unclaimed.180 The third method of displaying to the community the claims over a piece of 
land was the construction of a well.181 Although these spatial identifiers signaled to others 
the ‘ownership’ of the land within the Mzeina tribe, land has been considered corporate: 
the tribes have a right to all land use as long as the land remains undestroyed.182 
 The demarcation of land for common use was essential to the economic structures 
of the Bedu lifestyle. The lack of largescale tourism development or urbanization of the 
South Sinai under Israeli administration did not prepare the Bedouin for the rapid 
changes awaiting the territory under the Egyptian state project. While the Israelis 
attempted to prevent major changes to the land, while recognizing the inherent claims of 
the Bedouin, the Egyptian policies viewed the land as free and subject to the economic 
needs of the state. The major force in the nationalization of the land by the Egyptian state 
occurred with Law 143 of 1981, which placed the entire peninsula under the ownership 
of the state, with the implication that the land could be used, leased or sold to any other 
interested party.183 This legal nationalization fundamentally altered the Bedouin 
relationship to the land, formally moving its governance away from tribal affiliations and 
Bedouin customary law.184 The state attempted to partially honor the moral claim of the 
Bedouins through a forced division of the land, which was formally collectively used 
 
180 Goodman, Joshua. Contesting Identities in South Sinai: Development, Transformation and the 
Articulation of a ‘Bedouin’ Identity under Egyptian Rule. Tel Aviv University Press (2013). 99 
181 Ibid 
182 Ibid, 100 
183 Karbaki, Nadine. ‘Lifestyle Migration in South Sinai, Egypt: Nationalism, Privileged Citizenship and 
Indigenous Rights’. International Review of Social Research 3.1 (FEB 2013): 49 - 66, 55 
184 Ibid 
87 
 
through pastoral migration. This political attempt discriminated against the local 
community by forcing families to lay claim to one plot of land, which was required to be 
registered with local authorities through the payment of a onetime fee.185 This fee was 
often too expensive for most Bedouins to pay, and in the case of especially desirable 
land, the state chose to ignore the choices of the locals and instead sold the land to 
Egyptian investors.186  
 In the effort to secure government deeds to land not marked for tourism 
investment, some families scrambled to lay permanent cinder block homes or beach 
cafes, although these efforts were often met with the government bulldozing the 
unauthorized structures.187 The desperate attempts to claim land rights led to a cyclical 
process where Bedouin claimed land, sold it cheaply out of fear of confiscation, and then 
settled on the outskirts of tourist areas where they tried to reclaim ‘state-owned’ lands.188 
This fear of confiscation drove the Bedouin to sell their claimed plots for only 35-50 EGP 
per square meter.189  
 The coastal areas were of particular interest to Egyptian authorities who saw the 
unique opportunity to develop enclave-style tourist resorts on the sea. After the economic 
assessment of the peninsula, the seaside areas were declared strictly for tourism use under 
the Ministry of Tourism in 1988 through Prime Ministerial decree no 993.190 Two years 
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later, under Law no 7, the Tourism Development Authority was established with the 
mandate to consolidate tourism planning and building activities; this change divided the 
coast into development sectors and commenced both the beginning of tourism 
infrastructure building by the state and the auction of the land to private investors.191 This 
law allowed the state’s plan of tourism development to begin promptly, while effectively 
disenfranchising tribes who relied on access to the coast. In the effort to physically 
remove Bedouins from the most highly appraised areas, the government offered land in 
the interior of the peninsula for permanent settlement: 200 square meters of desert land in 
exchange for moving off of the coastline.192 
 The acquisition of the Sinai by the Egyptian State ushered in the current period 
with a swift dispossession of the land for the Bedouin tribes. The fundamental difference 
in the conceptualization of land ownership was evident with these changes: the most 
essential land could not be possessed by a single tribe or family according to customary 
law, the Egyptian state viewed the land as subject to its economic needs. This change 
relegated the tribes to certain portions of the space, which impaired their ability to 
maintain the economic activities underpinning their nomadic lifestyle. The 
sedentarization of the Bedouin, caused by the new limitations of space, altered the 
economic activities of the population.  
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3.2  Altered Bedouin Livelihoods 
 
 As state development projects commenced on the coast of the South Sinai, the 
Bedouin were forced to the margins of these new tourist spaces. Increasing urbanization 
and construction of tourist facilities limited the former economic endeavors of the 
Bedouin tribes. While the Sinai Development Plan emphasized the areas growing 
employment opportunities for mainland low-skilled young Egyptians in the developing 
tourism industry, the Bedouins were largely excluded from formal jobs. Along with the 
decreasing access to resources needed to sustain their economic way of life, the Bedouin 
were relegated to informal, but highly limited, work in the tourism sector. The socio-
economic changes taking place within these communities are differentiated by the 
tourism models presented by the Saint Katherine Protectorate, the resort city of Sharm El 
Sheikh, and the town of Dahab. 
 Among the Jebeliya tribes inhabiting the mountains near the Saint Katherine 
Monastery, the primary economic activities centered on herding and horticulture prior to 
1967. Each family owned an average flock size of 50 goats and sheep, which were relied 
upon for essential staples of milk, cheese, wool and hides.193 These tribes grew tobacco, 
various vegetables and fruits, such as dates, apricots, apples and figs, along with wheat to 
make bread.194 The coastal tribe of the Mzeina also heavily supplemented their diet and 
income with fishing off of the coast, while the plains inhabited by the Tiyaha tribes 
allowed them to keep larger herds of animals.195 One extinct practice noted by travelers 
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to the Sinai in the late 19th and early 20th century was the production and trade of charcoal 
for other goods and modest sums in Cairo.196 Additional means of gaining currency in the 
early 19th century was the leveraging of protection money from the monastery and renting 
caravan services to travelers moving through the territory.197  
 The economics of the Bedouin tribes before the changes implemented by the state 
were already shifting under Israeli Occupation. Members of the Bedu began to make 
money from the occupiers through wage labor to construct infrastructure in the area. This 
change marked a distinct shift from semi-nomadic pastoralism, horticulture, hunting and 
fishing.198 As the Bedu began to settle and accept paid work from the Israeli development 
efforts, average flock size for each family reduced from 80 to 13 and higher elevation 
orchards were typically abandoned.199   With the nationalization of the land by the 
Egyptian state and the swift undertaking of tourism development, the economic 
opportunities of the Bedouin in the area became limited to subsistence level informal 
work. 
 Development of the Sinai under Egyptian rule has increased poverty and has 
contributed to an extensive decline in the former livelihoods sustaining these tribes.  
Increased poverty stems from forced sedentarization and a simultaneous limitation on 
income generating activities with tourists. Several structural conditions contribute to the 
changing livelihoods of these groups such as limited education, prejudice of employers in 
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the position to provide secure work, limited access to tourism spaces and political 
processes dominating tourism spaces.200 As mentioned above, the tribes along the coast 
experienced divergent economic constraints because of the potential value of the land for 
tourism development.  
 Under Israeli occupation, the Sharm El Sheikh area began developing in early 
1972 as a town named Ophira.201 The population was relatively small in 1974, with about 
400 Israelis involved in tourism and supporting military facilities with about 300 to 400 
Bedouin.202 During this period, these Bedouin were living in a shantytown made of scrap 
metals while attempting to secure employment opportunities offered by Israeli 
developers.203 These Bedouin men had left their families among their tribes to pursue 
these opportunities, but the Israeli administrators had future plans to construct permanent 
housing for this population suitable for family life.204 Permanent housing for the Bedouin 
were to be built by the Israeli state within the town of Ophira. Ophira was developing 
faster than other locations in the final years before the Egyptian takeover of the space, as 
the Israelis began building a major resort on Naama bay and began to improve the 
facilities at the airport nearby.205 Although development of tourism facilities began 
during Israeli occupation, the planning incorporated the Bedouin of the area, a stark 
contrast to the development model implemented by the Egyptians. The Israelis sought to 
formally employ the Bedouin, alongside the creation of adequate housing, evidenced by 
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community training programs in lifesaving, restaurant service and construction.206 These 
training programs were located in the burgeoning towns of Sharm el Sheikh and Dahab.  
 The actual development of Sharm el Sheikh and the current relationship of the 
Bedouin to the tourism space has widely differed from the planning and nascent 
programs offered under Israeli occupation.  Bedu around the city of Sharm El Sheikh face 
highly limited access to work with tourism and must settle outside the city proper, with 
the tourism space itself contained by a wall which limits access and security checkpoints 
on the roadways entering the city. Construction on this highly contested wall began in 
2005 and symbolizes the final push to control the tourism space and limit the local 
population’s access.207 In 2002, the one hundred hotels in this resort enclave were 
estimated to have created between ten to thirty thousand direct jobs, which largely 
excluded the Bedouin population; in informal activities such as events like desert safaris, 
the work was strictly limited to Egyptian operators creating simulations of Bedouin life 
outside of the resort.208 Limitations on informal employment have increased in the last 
fifteen years, as the governor of Sharm el Sheikh began banning the Bedouin from 
interacting with tourists in the form of offering camel rides, mountain treks and holding 
tent parties at night.209  
 Opportunities in the town of Dahab are higher for the Bedouin, and although their 
work is highly controlled, they have more interactions with the tourism in this area. 
Dahab is a wholly different tourism space than the resort enclave of Sharm el Sheikh, 
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which positively impacts the ability for Bedouin to maintain a presence in this town. This 
town has been the center for low budget tourism for backpackers, originally young 
Israelis, but now caters to domestic tourism and other foreign nationalities. While Dahab 
currently remains a low budget and laid-back destination, the state plans to incorporate 
Dahab into the Egyptian Riviera planning- seeking to build five-star resorts and turning 
this tourism space into one which mirrors Sharm el Sheikh. This different form of 
tourism space allows for the Mzeina Bedouin to interact with tourism and in some cases 
maintain their own tourism based small businesses.  
 For the Mzeina settled around the Dahab tourism space, this interaction has 
fundamentally changed their internal social hierarchy and their yearly migration patterns. 
They began to migrate to Dahab during the Israeli administration to pursue opportunities 
offered by tourism, but these opportunities created disparate degrees of family wealth for 
the Bedu. Income activities related to tourism varied: selling land, owning coffee shops, 
or driving taxis, leading desert treks and selling drugs to foreigners.210 These formal and 
informal opportunities slowly began to form the basis of their economy, rather than 
subsidy, fundamentally changing their desire and need to engage in nomadic migration 
patterns or former income generating activities.211 
 The increasing presence of international visitors to Dahab, has produced a change 
in the types of souvenirs and goods sold by the Bedouin settled in the space. Moving 
from selling cotton pants and pitta bread to Israeli soldiers to producing goods aimed at 
the desires of young backpackers, the youth around Dahab now create different goods. 
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Tye-dye shirts and woven friendship bracelets have replaced the traditional Bedouin arts 
of beadwork and carpet weaving, which are time consuming and lack demand in the 
tourism market.212 
 Bedouin beachfront establishments in this town have increasingly changed into 
Egyptian-owned businesses since the 1970s.213 Since the rapid development phase of the 
late 1990s, the Egyptian authorities perceived the Bedouin run informal camps as a 
hindrance to formal development and tolerance for the spaces changed.214 In the face of 
changing official policy, a consultant for the Tourism Development Authority attempted 
to aid the local Bedouin in adequately complying with government regulations regarding 
these camps.215 By the year 2000, the pace of tourism development and the resulting 
outside interest in the potential of the coastline outmatched the economic interests of the 
Bedouin. This led to forceful removal of camps and cafes owned by Bedouin by the 
Tourism Development Authority using Egyptian soldiers.216 The government excused the 
actions through citing code violations, however, the space was technically marked for 
formal hotel development. The changing face of Dahab, a move from Bedouin ownership 
to Egyptian illuminates the tension at play: while the settled Bedouin of the area 
increasingly rely on tourism to sustain themselves, they are systematically 
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disenfranchised in favor of formal development projects and transplanted ownership of 
the few businesses in the town.  
 
3.3  Failure of ‘Sustainable’ Tourism Initiatives 
 
 One tourism space which stands apart from the experiences faced by Bedouin in 
Dahab and Sharm el Sheikh is that of the Jelebiyya surrounding the St. Katherine 
monastery. This tourism space is differentiated in the protected status of the area, which 
attempted to preserve the land, causing a unique experience for the tribe. Although this 
protected status in practice has changed significantly since its inception, the experience of 
the land and the Bedouin necessitate examination.  
 The designation of the St. Katherine Protectorate represents an acknowledgement 
by the state that tourism development presents potential harms to the environment. This 
acknowledgement came under pressure by local conservation scientists and international 
environmental organizations.217 The government under Mubarak classified almost forty 
percent of the South Sinai as different protected areas.218 These protected areas, when 
created in 1996, were conceptualized as sustainable development initiatives which could 
offer alternative means of livelihood and originally involved the Bedu in their 
planning.219 Although this policy committed to create development while providing for 
the local community, the pace of development left the intent of the initiative behind.  
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 Upon the inception of the St. Katherine Protected area, the conservation efforts 
were backed by a seven year development programme funded by the EU’s aid program at 
7.5 million Euros.220 Although funded by outside the state, the area was under the official 
management of the Egyptian Environmental Affairs Agency, but control was 
decentralized to the Protectorate’s administration working under the South Sinai’s 
Governorate.221 This decentralized control weakened the capacity for conservation of the 
protectorate’s administration. Funding by the EU in the beginning stages allowed for the 
consultation and employment of the Bedouin, while social services for the group were 
evaluated and delivered.222 By the early 2000s, a majority of the St Katherine 
Protectorate employees were from the Bedouin and the organization had set up a 
veterinary clinic, mobile health services and created a co-owned eco-lodge with 27 
Bedouin families participating in the ownership.223 With the vision of empowering the 
local community, the EU also helped establish a handicraft collective employing 300 
women.224 This respectful and mutually beneficial relationship between the local Bedouin 
and the administration of the Protectorate degraded with the ceased external funding, 
which deteriorated the services provided to the group.225 
 Gilbert argues that the community relations of the space weakened through the 
replacement of development discourse: external conceptualizations recognized the 
knowledge and rights of indigenous populations, while the state inherently viewed the 
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population as a burden and sought to change their lifestyle to fit the necessities of the 
state’s tourism project.226 This shift in perspective on the population is evidenced in the 
protectorate’s project of attempting to ‘re-educate’ the Bedouin on environmental 
protection. The protectorate also claims that the population over-grazes the area, 
essentially inferring that the practices of this community are destructive.227 
 The preservation of the land around the St. Katherine monastery has been 
severely compromised by the building of tourism facilities around the site and the 
construction of infrastructure to support other tourism projects. The tourism facilities 
around the monastery now include stucco apartments, a pharaonic gatehouse and bus 
facilities.228 This creation of the tourist space stands apart from the original buildings of 
the Bedouin, which were few stone houses built into the mountain side.229 Among the 
disfigurements of the land is a landfill built to support Sharm el Sheikh, a roadway 
through the heavily relied upon wadi next to the site, and the construction of a railway up 
Mount Sinai itself.230 
 
3.4  Shifting identities and Increased Resistance to the State 
 
 Several tensions have become inherent to the interactions of development, state 
policy and conceptualization of the indigenous community of the South Sinai. These 
tensions stem from both categorization of the Bedu by state policy and self-
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conceptualization of the community in relation to the nation state. The rapid development 
of tourism in the territory, along with the exclusionary policies of the state, have hindered 
any fostering of Egyptian nationalism within the community while promoting the 
perception of the Bedouin as outside the realms of citizenship within the state. The 
tensions emerging from this relationship have contributed to the alienation of the 
community and their rising resistance to the Egyptian state 
 Bedouin conceptualization of their self and relationship to outsiders began to 
change with the beginnings of tourism under the Israeli occupation. Tourist stereotypes of 
Bedouin life and culture, as promoted by guides, challenged the self-categorization of the 
Bedu.231 As Bedouin life was represented artificially to outsiders, the community 
recognized their move away from the stereotype presented. Folk narratives described a 
lifestyle withering away with the increase in financial opportunities in tourism, further 
challenging the notions of what it meant to be Bedouin.232 While the identity of the 
Bedouin was challenged with the burgeoning tourism industry under the Israelis, 
structural impediments to the maintenance of their nomadic lifestyle under the Egyptian 
state challenged their identity and fostered alienation from mainland Egypt. Tourism 
development in the South Sinai has fundamentally changed the Bedouins relationship to 
the land, their means of economic sustenance and ultimately their self-conceptualization. 
These social changes, forced from development policies outside of their community, bred 
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resentment through both exclusion from planning and heightened competition for the few 
economic opportunities in the form of economic migration from mainland Egypt.  
 The forceful divorce of the Bedouin from the land in the South Sinai remains a 
wound felt deeply due to their cultural conceptualization of nature itself. ‘The 
environment’ housing the Bedouin is often called simply ‘life’. This linguistic category 
illuminates that for the Bedouin, there is no separation between themselves and their 
environment, that the collective system within which they live is their life.233 The 
Bedouin take what they need from their local environment and do not see themselves as 
separate or above their land. The tribes regard themselves as part of an interdependent 
cycle as evidenced by both their entitlement and responsibility towards natural 
resources.234 The Bedouin view of nature is fundamentally different than the ‘modern’ 
conceptualization of the environment by the state: the difference between viewing the 
environment as an interdependent system, versus as an object to generate material 
gains.235 This fundamentally different view of the environment has produced a policy 
towards the coast of bending the natural environment to the needs of tourism 
development, while divorcing the Bedouin from their interdependent system of 
livelihood.  
 Removal from the land has fundamentally threatened the Bedouin system of 
livelihood. Before the carving of the land for tourism development, a diverse economic 
system allowed for the Bedouin to live off the land in various ways through herding, 
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fishing, planting crops, all based on seasonal migration. With the cutting off of the coast 
and the forced settlement in many cases of this population, the means of livelihood has 
inevitably changed and become highly dependent on access to paid work which allows 
for families to sustain themselves throughout the year. This reliance on paid work is 
complicated by the competition for employment from economic migration stemming 
from Mainland Egypt.  
 This removal from their environmental system has created a sense of inherent 
responsibility within the Bedouin community of fierce protection of the land against the 
encroachment of a disregarding developmental process. This removal speaks to the 
reinvented identity within the Bedouin community, as the community foremost identifies 
itself with the natural world and the pre-development livelihoods which are now 
limited.236 This reconstitution of identity is challenged by outsider encroachment on 
Bedouin land, as it stands as a fundamental undercutting of a cherished aspect of self-
identity. Growing feelings of the necessity of guarding nature against the state is one 
form of resistance practiced by the Bedu.237 This places the Bedouin community in 
contention with the state mandated authorities formally charged with protecting the land, 
further alienating the Bedouin community from the state which attempts to ‘modernize’ 
them.238 Furthermore, state narratives of the Bedouin further remove them from the 
perceived ability to ‘protect’ the land.  This contentious relationship between the state 
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authorities and the Bedu dominates the current alienation experienced around the St. 
Katherine Protectorate.  
 Formally the protectorate is mandated with environmental protection, stemming 
from the assumption that Bedouin activities damage the environment.239 The control of 
Bedouin is a more achievable goal than countering tourism development projects; so the 
protectorate focuses on ‘adjustments in patterns of Bedouin resource use’.240 The state 
narrative claims that Bedouin ‘overgrazing’ causes serious declines in vegetation 
threatening the biodiversity of the area.241 This perception insists that the uneducated 
Bedouin do not engage in real conservation and do not understand the balance necessary 
to protect the biodiversity of the area.242 The perpetrated stereotype feeds the states self-
imposed mandate of protection and the idea that the Bedouin must be modernized 
through education concerning their own land. The activities of the Mainland Egyptians in 
the territory, have created distrust over the idea of protection.  
 The policies of tourism development from the Egyptian state has further 
entrenched the ethnic cleavages present between mainland Egypt and Sinai Bedouin. The 
connections between nationality, citizenship and the land in the Sinai under Egypt create 
the tension between being a ‘national’ and being a ‘citizen’, both categories are a 
requirement to land rights.243 Early in the modern state project, Egyptian officials labels 
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the Bedu as inhabitants of the Sinai, excluding them from the category of citizen, while 
their government issued paperwork formally limited their movements.244 Formal 
citizenship, and the rights inherent, are demarcated by the state and necessarily impact 
the formally created right to land ownership.245 They have created a highly negative view 
of Egyptian state and society among the Bedouin population.  
 Development in the South Sinai, and the increasing ‘modernizing’ force this 
process creates has brought increasing access to material goods which changes the 
identity of the Bedu. The changing identity of these groups is doubly affected by better 
access to material goods through an internal assessment of people as modern or primitive, 
while the acquisition of modern goods makes people consider themselves and others as 
less Bedu.246 This is a process of dispossession: access to modernity forces the Bedu to 
leave their indigenous notions of prosperity.247 This diversion between bedu norms and 
the emergence of consumerism and individualism has eroded community cohesion, 
where once generosity and communal resource sharing dominated.248 
 The policy choices by the Egyptian government in their pursuit of tourism 
development have created higher alienation of the Bedouin in the South Sinai. This has 
led to a significant vulnerability within the territory due to the perceptions among the 
population of an outsider who encroaches on their land, destroying this highly valued 
source of life. While the Egyptian government sought to improve state economics 
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through this development, it failed to consult and incorporate the local community, 
removing them from the benefits and successes of the newly built space and also 
preventing any inherent feeling of responsibility to protect the growing tourism industry. 
From the beginnings of acquiring the land, the government authorities have alienated the 
local Bedouin and have sought to fully exclude them from the tourism rewards. This 
method of exclusion represents a distinct vulnerability of the tourism space through the 
active creation of outsiders with no reason to work towards promoting and protecting this 
new means of economic stability for the state.  
 This relationship between the outsiders and the local community fits within our 
overarching discourse of dependency, although it is a narrative of the state creating a 
space it can dominate and use for its own gains. The state seeks to modernize itself 
through the building of the tourism industry, and requires the effective modernization of 
the Bedu through forcing the community into the structural frameworks perpetrated by 
the state. Through the modernizing forces of tourism development, it has effectively 
excluded the local population while creating a relationship of dependency. The 
destruction of the Bedouin lifestyle came about with the building of the tourism space, 
obliging the population to support themselves with meager informal work on the 
periphery of the tourism space. Mainland Egyptian elite gained a majority of the profits 
and opportunities from the new tourism developments, while relegating the local 
community to the least profitable endeavors. Furthermore the structural disadvantage of 
the Bedouin in relation to the space has deepened social tensions with Mainland Egypt, as 
the Bedouin recognize the destruction of their lifestyle along with their isolation from 
gaining economic benefits from the industry. These factors have contributed to the 
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deteriorating security conditions currently facing the Sinai Peninsula, which are discussed 
thoroughly in the following chapter.  
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4.  POLITICAL INSTABILITY AND MANAGING TOURISM: CREATION AND 
COMPROMISE OF THE NEW TOURISM SPACE 
 
 Linear development of the tourism industry necessitates political stability, which 
presents a challenge to the Egyptian state. The development of tourism capabilities in the 
South Sinai was an attempt by the Mubarak regime to grow the tourism sector away from 
the violence destabilizing the sector in the 1990s. This tactic was initially successful: the 
new tourism developments in the Sinai did not suffer from the effects of a negative image 
transfer from the political violence occurring in mainland Egypt. Despite terrorists 
targeting the new tourism developments in the early 2000s, the industry continued its 
overall upward trend. Many disrupting forces have threatened this exponential growth, 
however, the most deadly attack on tourists in Egypt’s history crippled the tourism 
industry in the South Sinai. Although national tourism is currently experiencing an 
upswing, it is unclear when tourism will reach previous numbers in the South Sinai.  
 In the effort to understand the relationship of political instability and tourism in 
the South Sinai several components of this relationship necessitate examination. This 
chapter seeks to outline how political violence shaped the tourism vision for the South 
Sinai as a destination removed from the terrorism experienced in mainland Egypt. As 
terrorists began to target the new tourism space, how did the industry react? As political 
instability peaked with the Revolution, sparking a security vacuum in the peninsula, what 
were the interactions of security forces, terrorist elements and the tourism industry? 
Along with this assessment, the constraints on political control within the tourism 
industry will be discussed, as external influences on the perceptions and choices of 
tourists inevitably impacts the ability for the tourist space to recover. This chapter seeks 
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to broadly discuss the vulnerabilities of the tourism industry in the face of political 
instability, and in what ways policy choices have contributed to this growing 
vulnerability in the sector.  
 
4.1  Attempted Destabilization of the Regime: Terrorism and Tourism in the 1990s  
 
 Discontents towards the regime had little power to affect change during the 
1990s, which led these actors to deploy methods of terrorism in their attempt to affect the 
political climate. Simultaneously, the regime sought to establish economic stability in the 
effort to maintain political dominance. As discussed within the economic section of this 
study, one of the major methods to preserve itself when faced with externally mandated 
structural adjustment was the attempt to grow tourism as a means to promote 
employment, generate hard currency reserves, and maintain the balance of payments in 
trade. Tourism was growing in the 1990s, despite setbacks sustained through terrorist 
attacks. Diversification of the sector into sun/sand on the Red Sea and in the South Sinai 
represented an important avenue to foster growth and to provide stability when mainland 
tourism was challenged.  
 Terrorist actors have historically targeted tourism within Egypt due to the 
government’s economic reliance on tourism as an important part of the GDP and a major 
source of foreign currency. Politically, tourism has entrenched the regime by providing 
these macroeconomic benefits and by perpetuating neo-patrimonial support through 
selective privatization of the industry and the selling of facilities and land to domestic 
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elites.249 These twin benefits to the regime has led to the targeting of this sector, while 
socially, terrorist organizations have viewed the presence of foreigners as having a 
negative impact on Egyptian culture through the introduction of western values.   
 The shift from specifically aiming at security targets to soft targets was a long 
process of political exclusion of certain actors from state building and consolidation. 
Following exclusion from the political process after the revolution of the 1950s, 
marginalized Islamist groups have deployed acts of terror for various aims, with 
increased intensity since the late 1970s.250 Beginning with inter-community violence, 
terrorist actors moved to targeting the regime through attacks on police, riots and 
assassination attempts during the era of Sadat.251 With the successful assassination of 
Sadat by al-Gama’a al-Islamiyya, the newly appointed Mubarak regime quickly cracked 
down on these groups through mass arrests and other forms of repression. Government 
crackdown on Islamist organizations renewed their commitment to further harm the 
regime in the late 1980s, contributing to a shift of focus to soft targets in the 1990s.252  
 Terrorism against tourists significantly impacted tourism indicators in the early to 
mid-1990s, the impacts within the sector are illustrated in figure 2 below.  Between 
August 1992 and March 1995, 25 attacks against tourists occurred ranging from sniper 
shootings at cruise ships, buses and trains and bombings of cafes and restaurants.253 
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These frequent acts of terrorism contributed to lowered monthly arrivals of foreigners 
between 1992 and 1995. This impacted revenues from tourism for three years, dropping 
from 2.45 billion USD to 2.07 billion USD in 1993, with 1994 showing a further decline 
to 2.04 billion USD.254  
Figure 2. Monthly Tourist Arrivals Jan 1990 - May 1998 
  
 Tourism indicators recovered significantly following this stagnation, as terrorist 
attacks stalled and the government pursued heavy handed tactics including mass arrests, 
increased control over mosques, mass trials, and increased political repression within the 
formal party system.255 This recovery period, which provided a 43% increase in revenue 
between 1995 and 1996, was significantly challenged by the Luxor massacre, where 
shooters killed 70 tourists at the Temple of Hatshepsut.256 This massacre, representing the 
largest killing of tourists to this point, impacted the tourism sector through slashing 
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arrivals in half and creating a loss of over $200 million dollars. Figure 3 below 
demonstrates the impact of this attack on monthly tourist arrivals.  
Figure 3.. Monthly Tourist Arrivals Jan 1997 - Dec 1999 
 
The Luxor shooting was the largest attack in the mid to late 1990s, a component of a 
broader movement of violence against the state by al-Gama’a al-Islamiyya. The ultimate 
goal was the establishment of an Islamic state in Egypt through the fall of the secularized 
regime of Mubarak.257  Challenging the legitimacy of the regime, terrorism against 
tourists provided an exceptionally destabilizing impact economically through a decline in 
foreign receipts, a disruption of the balance of payments within the national budget, and a 
loss of revenue for the state. The impact of this political instability on yearly tourism 
revenues is illustrated in figure 4 below. This instability created by terrorism prompted 
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the Mubarak regime to pursue alternative strategies in stabilizing tourism through the 
creation of resorts in the South Sinai. 
Figure 4. Yearly Tourism Revenues 1992 - 2000 
This act of terrorism surprised the Mubarak regime, who hoped that the previous 
period of tranquility signified a weakened radical Islamist organization within the 
country.258 The Interior Minister was fired for essentially allowing the attack through a 
lack of security.259 The newly appointed Interior Minister vowed to tighten security to 
prevent another similar attack, while Mubarak himself attempted to assure the 
international community that this kind of attack could potentially occur anywhere in the 
world.260 The government replaced its strategy of mass arrests and mass trials leading to 
death penalty sentences, with an even tougher anti-terrorism campaign. Simultaneously, 
the strategy for the tourism sector emphasized diversification through a focus on 
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development of Red Sea resorts.261  The remote locations of these spaces and active 
branding as being detached from the turmoil of central Egypt, led the burgeoning Red 
Sea resorts to be immune to the national decline of 1997-1998.262  This immunity of the 
new tourism spaces emboldened the regime to intensify the building of tourism capacities 
in those spaces as a means to stabilize revenues within the national tourism sector. This 
diversification into sand and sea based tourism, along with the intensive building of these 
capacities, was a direct result of the violence focused on the heritage sites. While this 
strategy provided stabilized tourism arrivals and revenues throughout the early 2000s, 
terrorist actors met this success with a changed focus towards the newly profitably tourist 
resorts.  
 
4.2  Building Threat from the Unsecured Sinai 
 
 Conflict and contestation has characterized the history of the Sinai, while the local 
population has never been adequately integrated into any state building process of its 
occupiers. Israeli forces controlled the peninsula since the mid-1950s, except for a brief 
takeover by Egypt. This inter-state conflict concluded with the 1979 peace treaty between 
Egypt and Israel which negotiated demilitarization of the territory and a structured 
withdrawal of Israeli forces over a three year period. Following this formal conclusion of 
inter-state conflict, remnants of this contestation persist in the North and societal 
cleavages have emerged from the failure of integration of the territory with mainland 
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Egypt. Intra-state conflict now dominates the territory stemming from historical ties with 
Palestine, political exclusion of the Bedouin, and government security policy; this 
conflict escalated during the mid-2000s and has become protracted from cyclical 
violence.  
 Intra-state conflict emerged from the historical exclusion of the essentially 
stateless populations of the North: the Bedouin tribes and the former Palestinians. Tawhid 
wa Jihad, an Islamist organization sourcing members from these disenfranchised 
populations, pursued a campaign of violence against civilians in the South Sinai resorts 
during the mid-2000s. Political reasons for these attacks point to the contentious nature of 
politics near the crossing into Gaza, disenfranchisement and disconnection of the territory 
with mainland Egypt, and the relationship of the poor Upper Sinai with the more wealthy 
and better supported South Sinai (because of development of resorts and unequal access 
to donor aid).263 Following a seven year stagnation in terrorist activity, a period of 
cyclical political violence began with intensifying conflict: escalation of heavy handed 
security tactics on the part of the state, increased capabilities of terrorist organizations 
with renewed commitment to target tourism, and a widening socio-political disconnection 
between the Sinai and Cairo.  
 The first major terrorist attack on tourists during this period was in Taba, a border 
resort city between Israel and Egypt, where a car bombing in 2004 killed 34 vacationers 
and wounded almost 160 others (mostly Egyptian and Israeli). 264 This attack occurred 
following the Egyptian national holiday of 6th of October, an anniversary of the Egyptian 
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Army’s crossing of the Suez in the 1973 war.265 The specific motivations for this 
violence   was thought to extend from the Palestinian conflict, due to the location of the 
resort Taba, its popularity among Israeli vacationers, and date itself representing a point 
of extreme pride for the Egyptian state. 
 This surprising attack left the state scrambling to understand who perpetrated this 
attack. A severe crackdown in the North ensued, with the government mass arresting 
3000 people and holding hostage women and children until suspects surrendered.266 
These almost desperate mass arrests were followed by brutal torture in the effort to 
extract information related to the terrorist attack.267 This crackdown and the close control 
of the Northern Sinai by Egyptian security forces contributed to the strong desire of 
Tawhid wa Jihad to retaliate. 
 The second attack occurred in Sharm El Sheikh, a city often used by then 
President Mubarak for international summits, coincided with the anniversary of the 1952 
Revolution.268 This retaliatory attack utilized three separate bombs to kill almost 70 
vacationers, the vast majority being Egyptian.269 This attack was claimed by Tawhid wa 
Jihad and was met with additional security crackdowns by the regime, with additional 
mass arrests of suspects along with their neighbors and relatives.270 An additional 
retaliation occurred against the Egyptian state in the resort town of Dahab during the 
Egyptian holiday of Sham en-Nessim 2006, on the eve of the anniversary of Israel’s 1982 
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withdrawal from the territory.271 This final large attack killed 19 and injured 90 mostly 
Egyptian tourists.272 Following this third terrorist attack against the resorts in the South, 
the Regime increased its harsh tactics of widespread arrests and torture in the effort to 
disrupt terrorist networks in the Sinai. 
 The cluster of terrorist attacks in October 2004, July 2005 and April 2006 were a 
new development in the tactics of Sinai based terrorist organizations. Previously focused 
on small infrequent guerilla attacks on police and military installations in the North Sinai, 
the resort bombings in this era represented an escalation in the abilities and aims of 
Tawhid wa Jihad. These bombings coincided with Egyptian national holidays and were 
designed to kill Egyptians.273 All of these attacks were obviously meant to target the 
resort industry, to expose the government’s security failings, and to cause maximum 
possible damage to the sector.274 Even though this series of bombings directly targeted 
the tourism industry, the effects on tourism were short-lived and did not significantly 
affect the overall tourism sector of the state. Figure 5 below displays the yearly tourism 
revenues over the decade while figure 6 illustrates the trend in yearly tourist arrivals for 
the decade. 
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Figure 5. Yearly Tourism Revenues 2000 – 2010 
 
 
Figure 6. Yearly Tourist Arrivals 2000 - 2010 
 
The short lived impact on the national tourism sector can be seen in the monthly 
tourism arrivals, as evidenced in figure 7 below, but do not significantly impact the 
yearly tourist arrivals. The yearly tourism revenues were also immune to impact, and as 
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seen when looking at the trends of the overall decade, the September 11th attacks had a 
larger effect than these terrorist attacks in the South Sinai. The negative consequences of 
these attacks can be seen when looking at the slight interruption in foreign tourist arrivals 
in the South Sinai, the number of yearly Egyptian tourists to the South Sinai, and the 
disruption in the trends in hotel occupancy in the area. These trends are illustrated in 
figures 8, 9, and 10 below. These trends indicated that these attacks had a localized 
impact on tourism to the South Sinai, while not significantly affecting the overall sector.  
 
Figure 7. Monthly Tourist Arrivals Jan 2003 - Dec 2007 
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Figure 8.. Foreign Tourist Arrivals to South Sinai 2000 – 2009 
 
 
 
Figure 9. Egyptian Tourists to the South Sinai 2000 – 2010 
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Figure 10. Percent of Hotel Occupancy 2000 - 2010 
 
These terrorist attacks took the government by surprise as they represented a new 
frontier for terrorist organizations in the Sinai. The targeting of the tourism industry in 
the south was meant to create a sense of insecurity in the resorts, and was ultimately 
designed to impact the economic benefits of the growing resort tourism during this 
period. The targeting of Egyptians hurt domestic tourism in the region, as evidenced by 
the decline in occupancy and the decline of Egyptian tourism during the 2003 – 2005 
period. This decline did not translate to a decline in overall tourism in the state, as 
revenues and yearly tourist arrivals increased over this period. When looking at South 
Sinai tourism specifically, foreign tourist arrivals also increased during the 2002 – 2007 
period. 
These attacks were meant to send a message to the Mubarak regime through 
weakening one of the state’s most profitable industries and the deliberate targeting of 
Egyptian and Israeli tourists. However, dual processes occurred to further entrench this 
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conflict and increase radicalization among the Bedouin populations in the North. 
Politically, with every strike from terrorist organizations, the regime harshly responded 
through mass arrests which placed Bedouins in prison with Salafists. This tactic created 
the opportunity for radicalization within the historically disenfranchised population.275  
The stagnating socio-economic circumstances of the Northern Bedouin tribes contributed 
to the proliferation of smuggling networks and the blockade of Gaza in 2007 led to an 
opportunistic demand for goods for Hamas.276 This interdependence with Hamas gave the 
Northern Bedouins an economic lifeline through underground smuggling and furthered 
the ideological influence of Hamas within the North Sinai.277  
Following the security tactics deployed by the central government, terrorism 
targeting tourism declined. This development stemmed from the waves of mass arrests of 
suspects along with their families in the North and the heightened security presence. This 
temporary lull in terrorist activities targeting tourism continued until political instability 
in Cairo led to decreased ability for the central government to remain in control of the 
Northern Sinai.  
 
4.3  Political Instability, Escalated Violence, and Lawlessness in the Sinai 
 
 A highly complex security threat has emerged within the Sinai, due to several 
internal and regional challenges. Regionally, the increased cooperation between the 
 
275 Siboni, Gabi and Ram Ben-Barak. The Sinai Peninsula Threat Development and Response Concept. 
Saban Center for Middle East Policy (31)  JAN 2014. 
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Bedouin and Hamas in Gaza has led to the exchange of ideas and weapons, along with 
providing the Northern Bedouin tribes with a much needed economic lifeline in the form 
of smuggling. The increased movement between the borders through the underground 
tunnels have brought Hamas and other resistance fighters into the Sinai, which has been 
exacerbated by the decreased Egyptian security presence. Political instability in Cairo 
created an opportunity for resistance for the northern Bedouin tribes. The security 
vacuum created by the decreased security presence has created escalating cyclical 
violence, increased presence of terrorist organizations and higher technical capabilities 
for these groups.  
 The escalation of terrorism in the Sinai with the intensified government tactics to 
dispel these organizations has led to a protracted conflict in the north. Retaliation 
characterizes this conflict with guerilla tactics seeking harm to the central government 
and violent, widespread counter-insurgency measures perpetrated by the military. The fall 
of the Mubarak regime sparked resistance tactics as central security forces and police had 
largely withdrawn from their postings in the Sinai.278 This development was viewed as 
potentially short-lived, leading many northern Bedouin to begin to stockpile available 
weapons.279 Simultaneously, militants began attacking the trans-Sinai natural gas 
pipeline, a lingering symbol of the corruption of the fallen Mubarak regime, and 
attacking border guards and the few police remaining at their stations. 280 The insurgents 
claimed to specifically target Israel and sought to further erode central state control 
through attacks on security forces, infrastructure and border guards.281The increasing 
 
278 Laub, Zachary. ‘Security in Egypt’s Sinai Peninsula’. Council on Foreign Relations. 13 DEC 2013. 
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guerilla style tactics pursued by elements in the Sinai led the central government to 
respond with a large-scale deployment of troops with the permission of the Israeli 
government. 
 The first major military campaign against separatism occurred in August 2011, 
with the deployment of 1000 members of the military into the North Sinai.282 This 
offensive gave the central government a legitimizing reason to re-establish emergency 
law nationally. This offensive named Desert Eagle and its renewal, Operation Sinai in 
2012, was the largest deployment of troops and heavy weaponry into the territory since 
the Camp David Accords.283 With a severe lack of human intelligence on the ground, 
these offensives took the form of active engagement with militants within the civilian 
population.284 Although these operations scared the insurgents out of the main cities in 
the North, they regained organizational strength while in hiding and attacked border 
guards on two separate occasions, despite increased security presence.285 
 The elections in Egypt brought new national leadership who attempted to alter the 
approach to security in the Sinai, although the abilities of the leadership were limited in 
the face of political power of the military leadership. Morsi sought to use diplomacy as a 
first response to guerilla tactics of terrorist cells, in the form of negotiation and mediation 
with tribal chiefs in the northern Sinai.286 Morsi sought the input of these tribes in 
instilling peace in the peninsula, while militants and arms continued to flow into the Sinai 
 
282 Laub, Zachary. ‘Security in Egypt’s Sinai Peninsula’ Council on Foreign Relations. 11 DEC 2013. 
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and underground into Gaza. Challenging the strategy for peace, more soldiers and police 
were killed or abducted under Morsi leadership.287 These developments ultimately 
widened the gulf between the Morsi regime and the senior military leadership within 
Egypt.  
 While the Morsi government sought a softer approach, the coup in mid-2013 
changed security policy towards the territory which intensified the conflict. Alongside the 
stark change in security policy, the removal of the Morsi government angered insurgents 
and attacks on security forces increased in frequency in the months following.288 Higher 
frequency of terrorist attacks and growing extremism was met with strong government 
crackdown on Islamists following the consolidation of power by the al-Sisi Regime.289 
The government sought to control the area through an approach of eradication, while 
militant attacks on security forces became frequent and more sophisticated.290 The al-Sisi 
government responded to the more lethal and sophisticated attacks on security forces with 
a brutal campaign of violence within the North Sinai characterized by largescale 
bombings and the displacement of the local population. The heavy handed military 
operations have included media blackouts and widespread curfews since 2013.291 
 Among the many terrorist organizations in the territory, Ansar Beit al-Maqdis, a 
Salafi jihadi organization originally focused on attacking Israeli targets, has emerged as 
significant threat to the Egyptian state. The group emerged in 2011, although it stems 
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from connections with Tawhid wa Jihad, the group responsible for the earlier attacks on 
the tourism industry in the South Sinai resorts.292 This organization turned its focus to the 
Egyptian State in 2013 in the form of attacks on the police and military, and has 
expanded their capacity to target civilians in Cairo and the South Sinai.293 This 
organization pledged their allegiance to the Islamic State in November 2014.294 With the 
allegiance to the Islamic State, attacks on government forces became larger in scale and 
more complex which indicated a true cooperation with IS leadership and the acquisition 
of more advanced weapons.295 
 The former Ansar Beit al-Maqdis, now named Wilayat Sinai (Sinai State), has 
sought to create a sense of instability within the territory through guerrilla and insurgent 
style attacks, aided by the local Bedouin. Focused on undermining central government’s 
authority, Wilayat Sinai has effectively exploited the longstanding cleavages between the 
local population and Cairo.296 As the focus has shifted from the state to civilian targets, 
the capabilities of the organization have also grown. The bombing of Metrojet flight 
9268, claimed by Wilayat Sinai, indicated a change in the abilities of the organization, 
increased access to more sophisticated weapons, and enhanced political ambitions.297 
 The tragic bombing of Metrojet flight 9268 represented a major blow to Egyptian 
tourism and economic stability, while representing a definite shift in political aims of 
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Wilayat Sinai. The targeting of a Russian flight, with almost all 224 victims of Russian 
nationality, indicated the ability to affect international politics in line with the ambitions 
of the global Islamic State movement.298 The organization stated that this attack was in 
retaliation for Russian airstrikes in Syria and Moscow’s alliance with Syria.299 Alongside 
the international message regarding Syria, this act of terrorism was the largest against 
tourists in Egypt’s history and has had an unprecedented impact on the national tourism 
sector.  
 Following this tragedy, the al-Sisi regime drastically increased their offensive 
efforts against militants in the North Sinai, escalating the cyclical violence in the 
territory. Attacks perpetrated by militants were over 357 incidents in 2015, and counter 
terrorism efforts resulted in 3000 deaths in 2015 alone.300 Matching the number of 
fatalities, detentions had also substantially increased to 3,600 in 2015.301 Along with the 
detentions and fatalities, the army’s tactics included the destruction of tunnels connecting 
the Gaza Strip and the North Sinai and sought to drive the population into military-
controlled areas through displacement caused by attacking residential areas.302 
 These tactics to eradicate militant strongholds in the North and exert control over 
the population have continued until the recent Sinai 2018 campaign. This newest 
offensive has focused on villages and suburbs of cities in the north, El-Arish, Sheikh 
Zuwayyed and Rafah, which has further displaced the civilian population.303 This 
 
298 Gold, Zack. Salafi Jihadist Violence in Egypt’s North Sinai: From Local Insurgency to Islamic State 
Province. ICCT Research Paper. International Centre for Counter-Terrorism. APR 2016. p 21.  
299 Ibid 
300 ‘Peninsular War: Egypt is Losing Control of the Sinai’ The Economist. 14 NOV 2015. 
301 Ibid 
302 Ibid 
303 Sabry, Mohamed. “Operation Sinai 2018: A theatrical stunt before the Presidential Elections?’ Middle 
East Eye.13 FEB 2018.  
125 
 
development comes after years of mass detention and torture, bombardment of civilian 
areas and bombings of militant strongholds in the north Sinai since the beginning of the 
al-Sisi administration. This military based strategy has sought to weaken the radical 
elements embedded in the governorate, but the fight for control of the North Sinai 
continues.  
 
4.4  Destination Management with Limited Control 
 
 While the al-Sisi regime attempts to stabilize the Northern Sinai, in the interest of 
creating a secure environment for tourism recovery in the South, challenges remain. The 
tourism industry in Egypt is highly susceptible to political instability, emerging both 
internally and externally. The neighborhood effect has impacted tourism, especially in the 
escalation of violence in Gaza, and domestic acts of terrorism against the industry have 
caused fluctuations. The tourism sector has been in decline with the advent of political 
insecurity caused by the revolution in early 2011, with significant challenges to the 
industry occurring continuously until the tragedy of the Metrojet flight 9268 crash. The 
crash highlighted the highly limited control the state has over three major components of 
the tourism industry: the security of the space, the demand for tourism, and the perception 
of instability within the destination.  
 This attack occurred in a highly vulnerable environment for national tourism in 
Egypt. Since the Revolution in 2011, the industry has suffered significant decline. The 
revolution immediately impacted the sector with a loss of 5 million tourist arrivals and a 
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billion dollars in revenue over 2011.304 These trends are displayed in figures 11 and 12 
below. This was the beginning of a decline over a six year period, with revenues steadily 
dropping from 11 billion dollars in 2010 to only 4 billion dollars in 2016.305 Tourist 
arrivals showed a loss to 9 million arrivals in 2011, increasing back to 11 million in 2012 
before declining to 9 million until its lowest point in 2016 with 5 million tourist 
arrivals.306 The specific impact of the Metrojet bombing is illustrated in monthly tourism 
arrivals in figure 13 below. The anomaly of the temporary increase in arrivals can be 
attributed to a slight recovery in the industry before the further decline following the 
ouster of Morsi. The heavy losses within the tourism industry demonstrate the combined 
effect of political instability and terrorist violence on the tourism sector.  
 
Figure 11. Yearly Tourist Arrivals 2010 - 2016 
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Figure 12. Yearly Tourism Revenues 2010 – 2017 
 
Figure 13. Monthly Tourist Arrivals Jan 2015 - Oct 2017 
 
 Long term political instability negatively impacts a country’s tourism industry 
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rapidly declines following terrorist violence, a full recovery commences after six 
months.308 This was historically due to heritage tourism providing the foundation of the 
industry prior to the Luxor Massacre. Heritage tourism is unique, which discourages 
tourists from engaging in destination substitution.309 In long term political instability, 
cyclical violence between the government and terrorist organizations push potential 
tourists to choose other holiday destinations deemed safer.310 This finding is especially 
true for European travelers who show particular sensitivity to Egyptian government 
crackdown on Islamist opposition.311 Ongoing perception of high political risk 
significantly erodes tourism arrivals and revenues.312 These findings work together to 
explain the persistent difficulty of tourism recovery following the fall of the Mubarak 
Regime. Rapid political changes, violence against opposition parties, escalating terrorist 
attacks with reprisals from the state, and the largest terrorist attack against tourists in 
Egypt’s recent history have combined to cripple the national and regional tourist 
industries. This is complicated by the highly substitutable nature of Sharm el Sheikh as a 
resort enclave: when faced with political violence and insecurity, tourists travel to 
alternate destinations. 
 The fallout from the Metrojet crash has severely impacted the tourism sector in 
the South Sinai, especially in the city of Sharm El Sheikh. This region accounted for 
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almost 30% of the national tourism industry in 2014, with about 2.8 million tourist 
arrivals, and its visitors were overwhelmingly Russian and European.313 However after 
this tragedy Russian arrivals dropped from 3 million (32% of national foreign arrivals in 
2014) to 54,000 by 2016- representing a loss of 98%.314 This change is illustrated in 
figure 14 below. And other tourism arrivals from European countries also significantly 
dropped to their lowest points following this tragedy: losing 84% of British visitors from 
2010, 88% of German tourists, and 88% of Italian visitors.315 This downward trend since 
the onset of political instability is displayed in figure 15 below. Within Sharm el Sheikh 
itself, out of 216 hotels in the city, 100 closed or moved to other locations on the Red Sea 
within 2016.316 In 2015, the city sustained an 8% decrease in occupancy and in 2016, 
occupancy within hotels dropped an additional 43%.317 Overall tourism into the city 
declined by 70% over 2015 – 2016.318 Egyptian officials have estimated that the damage 
to the tourism industry within Sharm el Sheikh stands at 10 billion Le or about $566 
million USD.319 
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Figure 14. Monthly Russian Arrivals Jan 2012 - Nov 2016 
 
 
Figure 15. Tourist Arrivals by Nationality 2010 - 2016 
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 The significant impact of the insurgency in the Sinai on the tourism sector has 
been a major challenge to the Egyptian state. The cyclical violence occurring in the Sinai 
also poses a unique challenge to tourism, as securing the territory will aid in restoring the 
confidence in tourists but the heavy handed tactics and retaliatory attacks also encourage 
tourists to choose alternate destinations in the interim. In the immediate weeks and 
months following the Metrojet disaster, the al-Sisi regime sought to both physically 
secure the new tourism space while attempting to assure foreign governments of safety 
measures for tourists. Both of these attempts were necessary to quell further negative 
impacts on the tourism sector (and broader national economy) due to the unequal nature 
of the relationship between the destination and the countries of origin of tourists.  
 The security of the new tourism space was an immediate priority for the al-Sisi 
government. The central government escalated their offensive strategy against separatist 
and radical militants embedded in the North Sinai. This strategy has been heavy handed 
in the detention and torture of suspects, the bombing of militant strongholds, and has 
sought to exert control over the local population through displacement. Within the 
tourism space itself, the security measures were heightened substantially. While the 
government already highly controlled Sharm El Sheikh, through the building of an 
external wall in 2006, checkpoints were strengthened on the single road going into and 
out of the city. Fixed and movable checkpoints were added along this main road and new 
security cameras were added in the main entrances. The security based approach has also 
forced the government to allow foreign consultants to inspect the domestic airports and 
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has complied with their recommendations to demonstrate their commitment to the highest 
standards of security.  
 A major contributor to the extreme loss of tourism, the security of the airport was 
paramount. The most devastating action from foreign governments was the 
implementation of travel bans on Egypt and the suspension of flights into the Sharm el 
Sheikh airport. The government of Egypt has sought to remove these travel bans and has 
attempted to adequately secure both the Sharm el Sheikh airport and the parameter of the 
city itself. Russia suspended all direct flights to Egypt following the terrorist attack. It 
wasn’t until the end of February 2018 that the Russian government permitted some direct 
flights to resume into the Cairo airport.320 Egypt cooperated with Russian investigators 
following the tragedy, and worked in tandem with foreign security experts to overhaul 
security within the Sharm el Sheikh airport. This cooperation was necessary, as Russian 
officials vowed to keep the travel ban until their security experts cleared the security 
procedures at Egyptian airports.321 The UK government responded very quickly in the 
days following the attack, where they rushed to return all British holidaymakers from 
Sharm el Sheikh. The UK government swiftly imposed a travel ban to Egypt and 
suspended flights into the Sharm el Sheikh airport, followed by the German, Italian and 
Dutch governments taking the same measures.322 While the UK lifted the general travel 
ban to Egypt, a ban remains in place against all but essential air travel to Sharm El 
Sheikh.  
 
320 Maguid, Mohamed. “Russia to Resume Flights to Egypt by Feb.20’.Egypt Today. 9 FEB 2018 
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 The demand for the new tourism space in the South Sinai has decreased with the 
political instability and violence occurring within Egypt. Demand is externally created 
and influenced, especially in the case of Sharm El Sheikh. Demand for sun/sand based 
destinations changes, as these locations are homogenous and highly substitutable. As 
previously discussed, the space was envisioned to cater to the mass tourism market 
emerging from the European middle class. While originally positioned competitively 
against other sand/sun locations in price point and physical location, the advent of 
violence and the complications of travel bans have lessened the demand for Sharm El 
Sheikh and encourages vacationers to choose other resorts. The South Sinai has lost its 
former attractive low price point for travelers, and suffers from a highly negative image 
of being unsafe for travel. With the travel bans in place, the price of flying to Sharm El 
Sheikh rises due to the need to layover in Cairo or another city before continuing to the 
destination. The low price of Sharm El Sheikh was heavily reliant on the ability for mass 
beach tourists to use direct flights. The inability for these tourists to fly directly into 
Sharm El Sheikh has negatively impacted the ability for Sharm El Sheikh to compete 
against other similar destinations, and the resumption of flights into the city is controlled 
by the decision making of origin countries. Demand for the tourism relies on more than 
the price points of the destination, especially in locations which are perceived to be high 
risk for the tourist. The perception of risk negatively impacts the decision making of 
potential tourists.323 The political environment within Egypt can be considered a high risk 
political atmosphere for tourism within the parameters of this study due to political 
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repression, cyclical violence in the Sinai and violent political change within the last seven 
years. The higher price of travel for the mass beach tourist, the highly substitutable resort 
enclave model, and the perception of insecurity all contribute to tourists deciding against 
vacations in Sharm el Sheikh. 
 
4.5  Insecurity and the Compromised Tourism Space 
 
 Ironically, the new tourism space in the South Sinai offered the Mubarak 
government a chance to foster growth in the tourism sector away from the fluctuations 
faced by the industry during the height of terrorist activity in the 1990s. While the 
government rapidly built the space and marketed it to the beach tourists coming from 
Europe, the growing terrorism in the North Sinai saw the opportunity to affect political 
change through the targeting the growing success of resorts in the South Sinai. With the 
breakdown of the Mubarak regime and the sparking of insurgency in the North, the 
tourism space in the South was increasingly vulnerable to political violence.  
 As Egypt experienced political instability over the last seven years, the tourism 
industry reacted negatively with each major upheaval. The revolution itself decreased 
tourism significantly, effectively costing the state over a billion dollars in tourism 
revenues with a sustained loss of 5 million tourists in 2011 alone.324 The downward trend 
in yearly national tourism indicators since the revolution is striking, with each year 
falling and substantial losses during 2013 and 2016 coinciding with the coup d’état and 
the Metrojet bombing at the end of 2015. The mainland political instability created a 
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security vacuum and an opportunity for armed resistance in the North Sinai.325 While 
tourism indicators in the South Sinai showed sustained revenues and tourist arrivals 
despite the downward national trend before the end of 2015, the growing insecurity in the 
peninsula allowed for the growth of terrorist capabilities and the eventual turning of the 
focus of these organizations, once again, to the resorts in the South Sinai. 
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CONCLUSION:  THE VULNERABILITIES OF INSTABILITY, EXCLUSION 
AND STUNTED TOURISM DEVELOPMENT 
 
 
 The tourism space of Sharm El Sheikh exemplifies the resort enclave developed 
for the mass tourism market. This development has contributed to the vulnerability of the 
tourism space to decline, which has been complicated by the devolving security threat on 
the peninsula. In the effort to explore the government policy and external forces driving 
development of this enclave, this project has examined the historical development, the 
socio-economic dynamics of the created resort, and the security threats posed to the 
space. The four research questions posed by this study have attempted to operationalize 
the variables of government choice and limitations in power. The multiple vulnerabilities 
to decline in the tourism space, the economic, social and security dynamics of the created 
space have been examined. The first section analyzes the state’s motivations in designing 
Sharm El Sheikh and encouraging its growth, along with the inherent vulnerability in 
targeting mass beach tourism through the design of the resort. The relationship of the 
local population and the tourism space was discussed through the second portion of this 
study, and the third section broadly outlines the significant challenge of security to the 
tourism enclave.  
 Dependency theorists heavily critique tourism in the global south due to the 
inherent lack of power associated with a variety of structural, economic and social 
conditions which influence the creation and maintenance of tourism spaces. The classic 
dependent relationship outlined by many case studies focus on mass beach tourism and 
the necessity for homogenous resort enclaves in the pleasure periphery. External forces 
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exploit these spaces through profit leakages, foreign management and ownership of 
tourism facilities, externally controlled packages for travel, control over demand for the 
tourism space, and the dictation of a homogenous product of the resort enclave. Sharm el 
Sheikh presents a unique case, which does not completely align with the dependency 
modeled by other tourism enclaves.  
 The point of departure in the Sharm el Sheikh model of the tourism enclave is 
where our research questions focus. The state’s choices in the development of this resort 
holds an irony: the regime sought to resist external influences through the attempted 
creation of a stable form of revenue, but traded formal control for the informal influence 
of  the power of externally controlled consumer demand. The resort enclave was born 
from a need to stabilize the tourism sector away from Mainland Egypt when faced by the 
highly destabilizing force of terrorism in the 1990s. This need for stable tourism was due 
to the sectors capability of giving the state foreign reserves and extra funding for state 
budgets. Socially, tourism represented a means of employment, when structural 
adjustments threatened to erode the tenuous financial security of the population. The 
regime faced a tough decision imposed by external debts: mandated structural 
adjustments endangered the regime due to the potential hardships faced by the 
population. The development of the resort enclaves during the late 1990s allowed for a 
means to dictate the scheduling of structural adjustments according to the timetable 
decided by the regime, while creating new and stable employment opportunities. This 
new tourism for the state aided in resisting powerful outside influence, although the 
influence over the economic stability of the tourism sector shifted after the rapid 
development of the enclave.  
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 The resort was intentionally designed to capture the market of the European mass 
tourist. The rapid development of Sharm El Sheikh was encouraged through government 
policy due to the need to diversify the tourism sector away from instability created by 
terrorism. This model places the power in the hands of the mass tourism market, as 
demand is created and controlled externally. Package tours created in tourist’s home 
countries encourage a race to the bottom within the resort: in the effort to capture 
consumers, hotels and facilities must compete for business through attractive price points. 
These packaged tours dictate where tourists visit and are able to maintain a majority of 
the profits from tourism. Mass tourism degrades the destination according to the model of 
the Tourism Area Life Cycle. The standardization and over use of the resort results in a 
damaged environment, declining image of the destination, surplus of tourism facilities, 
and a heavy reliance on repeat visitation. The exploitation of the resort through mass 
tourism essentially destroys the demand for the tourism space. The mass tourism business 
eventually leaves the destination without a significant reorientation of tourism strategy. 
The deliberate design of Sharm el Sheikh for mass beach tourism, while once a resistance 
to outside control, has created an informal dependency on external perception and 
demand, while the space has diminished ability to compete against other standardized 
beach locations.  
 External control over tourism to the resort also manifests politically. In the case of 
political instability or violence, the image of the space is threatened through the 
narratives circulated through the international media. Negative image of the destination 
necessarily decreases demand for the space, as potential tourists engage in destination 
substitution in favor of safer locations. Security risks for tourists are evaluated by foreign 
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governments who sometimes choose to formally warn citizens against travel. This 
subjective assessment of security risk is heavily dependent on relations between the 
origin and destination, and in the case of the global south, is a relationship marked by 
inequality. Destinations have little power to change the security warnings issued by 
foreign governments. The perception concerning security represents an additional area 
where the global south destination is subject to the power of origin countries. For Sharm 
el Sheikh, the foreign issued travel warnings and the halting of direct flights to the resort 
effectively crippled the city’s tourism for over a year and a half, with Egypt having 
virtually no control over changing the narrative created through these actions.  After the 
development of the resort, the control initially exerted by the state eroded through the 
inability to dictate demand or pricing for the resort.  
 The resort enclave of Sharm El Sheikh, built by the state, is wholly inorganic. 
Mainland Egypt’s modernizing project of tourism development in the South Sinai 
excluded the local population, breeding resentment towards the state. The Bedouin 
dispossession of land dismantled their economic livelihoods and relegated the population 
to the outskirts of these enclaves. The influx of Egyptian workers into these resorts 
ensured further economic exclusion through the denial of available employment through 
the tourism sector for the local population. Negative perceptions of the Bedouin have also 
encouraged local government authorities to regulate the interactions between tourists and 
Bedu, limiting their ability to gain informal income from tourism. This relationship has 
replicated the power inequalities denounced by dependency theorists. The external force 
has created the tourism space, without regard for the local economic and social context. 
The enclave’s resources have been subject to the needs of the state, while the 
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government, elites and Mainland Egyptian workers have substantially benefited from 
opportunities created through the exploitation of this space. The local community has 
suffered through destruction of their livelihoods and the lack of opportunity to gain 
adequate income from tourism.  
 The devolving security in the Sinai threatens to prolong the difficult recovery of 
the tourism industry. This factor is complicated by the main tourism to the area emerging 
from the mass tourism market. The protracted conflict is cyclical in nature, with 
retaliatory actions taking place between terrorist elements and state security forces. The 
isolation of the territory and the alienation of the Bedouin population challenges the 
ability for the state to secure the region, as it has little actual intelligence on the 
conditions on the ground, and the population has little incentive to aid in security 
operations. This complicated crisis severely impacts tourism as ongoing conflict 
encourages mass tourism operators to choose alternate destinations. Heavy handed tactics 
by security forces impact tourism demand alongside terrorist activity. The security 
challenges posed by the convoluted situation in the Sinai will continue to threaten the 
recovery of the tourism sector, especially in the case of the resort enclave of Sharm el 
Sheikh.  
 Government decision making in tourism development, originally resistance 
measures to external fiscal control, created several vulnerabilities to decline within this 
industry in the case of Sharm el Sheikh. Designed as a resort enclave, marketed to the 
mass beach tourist, and overly reliant on this form of tourism, Sharm el Sheikh was 
vulnerable to decline according to the Tourism Area Life Cycle as modeled by the work 
of Butler. The addition of social tensions created by economic and physical exclusion of 
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the local population created a contentious environment for this resort. The Metrojet 
disaster and the larger conflict between terrorist elements and security forces have created 
a volatile situation, which significantly degraded tourist arrivals to the resort and threaten 
the ability of Sharm el Sheikh to fully recover.   
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